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As a dispute resolution service provider, the justice system ought to provide effective legal 
remedies to address the justice needs of people. Apart from having the capacity to provide the 
legal remedies, the system has to be accessible as well. In marital violence disputes, one of 
the general interests of both the State and the affected individual spouses is to prevent further 
abuse. Courts offer this remedy, among others, by imposing restraining orders, which are 
backed up by punitive threats. On the other hand, facilitative mechanisms of dispute 
resolution such as mediation do not have the power to impose punishment on contemptuous 
parties. However, facilitative dispute resolution processes encourage joint problem solving, 
which is desirable in maintaining a workable relationship between spouses. This research 
argues that in order to ensure optimum access to justice in marital violence disputes there is a 
need for a dispute resolution system that offers facilitative and advisory mechanisms of 
dispute resolution alongside court processes. However, in Malawi, rural citizens face the 
barriers of language and use of English law-orientated procedures when accessing courts. 
Furthermore, some customary law practices and statutory law provisions encourage the view 
that mediation in marital violence disputes precludes concurrent access to court remedies. 
This research explores the challenges which this current approach to marriage dispute 
resolution poses to women married under customary law. It answers the question whether the 
justice system, with its English law-orientated procedures and the tenet of mandatory 
mediation or reconciliation, offers appropriate and effective mechanisms of resolving marital 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Family is recognised by law in Malawi as a fundamental unit of society.1 An essential feature 
of the family unit is the institution of marriage. Since marriages create interconnections 
between families, they in turn become the building blocks of society.2 On that basis, the 
constitution mandates the state and society at large to protect this institution.3  
However, marriage or family disputes are inevitable. A regime of dispute resolution to 
facilitate reconciliation of couples and dissolution of marriages is necessary. Such a family 
dispute resolution system has to balance the interests of all stakeholders in the family unit. On 
the one hand, there is need to protect the marriage institution from disintegration.4 In 
situations where there are children, the state has interest to protect the children’s welfare.5 On 
the other hand, these interests have to be counter balanced with those of individual spouses 
seeking redress from consequences of marriage breakdown. Therefore, the justice system 
needs to provide appropriate methods of dispute resolution that are capable of balancing these 
interests. 
Currently, through statutory obligation, non-court dispute resolution mechanisms are placed 
to precede courts’ hearing of divorce petitions.6 Courts can entertain petitions only if they are 
satisfied that the parties to the marriage in question have taken all practical steps to save the 
marriage.7 This approach is not new in Malawian family law as it has its roots in customary 
law.8  
This study explores the challenges which the current set-up of marriage dispute resolution 
poses to women married under customary law. It examines whether the customary family law 
dispute resolution regime and the current statutory requirements promote the rights of women 
married under customary law to access justice in the context of marital violence disputes.  
                                                          
1 S 22(1) of Malawi Republican Constitution, 1994. 
2 NyaNg’ambi v Mkandawire Civil Appeal Case No. 68 of 1981 NTAC (Unreported). 
3 S 22(1) of the Constitution. 
4 S 59(1)(a) of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act No. 5 of 2015. 
5 S 59(1)(c)(ii) of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
6 S 59(1)(b) of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
7 Ibid. 
8 NyaLongwe v Lungu Civil Appeal Case No. 25 of 1977 NTAC (Unreported).  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
There are four types of marriages recognised in Malawi. These are civil marriages, customary 
marriages, religious marriages, and marriages by repute or permanent cohabitation.9 
However, the majority of people contract their marriages under customary law.10  
The court system is largely inaccessible for the majority of rural people because of financial, 
geographical, and procedural barriers.11 Customary procedural and institutional mechanisms 
of dispute resolution, on the other hand, are said to be easily accessible to many.12 This 
should also be considered in light of the possible establishment of local courts under the 
Local Courts Act.13 The expectation is that the local courts will increase access to justice by 
applying customary law through procedures which are familiar to rural people.14 This is in 
contrast with the procedure, influenced by English law ideologies, that is used in magistrate 
courts.15  
Nonetheless, cultural systems from which customary law derives its operational bases are 
platforms that potentially promote violations of human rights against vulnerable groups 
including women.16 It is likely that the same procedural customary law dispute resolution 
mechanisms which are readily accessible in terms of distance, cost and language may be an 
                                                          
9 S 13(1) of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act; S 22(4) of the Constitution. 
10 In 2001, the High Court estimated that over 95% of marriages are contracted under customary law (Jamal v 
Jamal (Matrimonial Case No. 1 of 1989) [2001] MWHC 45 (01 October 2001) available at 
http://www.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court-general-division/2001/45/, accessed on 6 October 2016; L 
Mwambene The impact of the Bill of Rights on African customary family laws: A study of women's rights in 
Malawi with some reference to developments in South Arica unpublished LLD (UWC) (2009) xiv; Malawi 
Nation, ‘Divorce Rate Rise’ available at http://mwnation.com/divorce-rate-rise/, accessed on 24 February 2016). 
11 W Schärf et al Access to Justice for the Poor of Malawi? An Appraisal of access to Justice provided to the 
poor of Malawi by the Lower Subordinate Courts and the Customary Justice Forums (2002) 9–18. 
12 Schärf op cit note 11 at 39. 
13 Local courts (which were referred to as traditional courts) existed prior to the year 1994. These courts 
functioned across the country including in the rural areas. In April 2011, Parliament passed the Local Courts Bill 
which provides for the re-introduction of ‘traditional courts’. The President, however, did not assent to the Act. 
Instead he referred it to the Malawi Law Commission for review. See Encyclopedia of Nations ‘Malawi Judicial 
System’ available at: www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Malawi-JUDICIAL-SYSTEM.html, accessed on 6 
October 2016; see also IBAHRI Rule of Law in Malawi: The Road to Recovery (2012), available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VObVdj4lkAsJ:www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.asp
x%3FDocumentUid%3DC9872074-1DF6-47E7-B2AA-728144009382+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk, accessed on 
25 February 2016. 
14 Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Traditional Courts Act (2007) 7 available at 
http://www.lawcom.mw/docs/Report_on_the_Review_of_the_Traditional_Courts_Act.pdf, accessed on 
13 December 2016. 
15 Malawi, which was a British Protectorate, inherited laws influenced by English ideologies. The Courts Act, 
which provides for civil procedure, was enacted in 1958 when the country was still under British rule. 
16 Schärf et al op cit note 11 at 39. 
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obstacle to accessibility of substantive justice.17 For example, mandatory mediation, 
conciliation, or other means of non-court dispute resolution before a divorce petition can be 
granted may not be suitable in all cases.18 One type of potential cases unsuitable for 
mediation is matters involving marital violence.19  
Unlike courts, mediators do not have enforcement mechanisms to compel parties to comply 
with what has been agreed or resolved.20 Yet spouses victimised by violence need a court’s 
determinative and coercive power to protect them from their abusive partners. Mandating 
conciliation in such cases delays access to suitable courts’ remedies that effectively address 
the problem. This may amount to breach of one’s right to access an effective remedy by a 
court of law.21  
Therefore, there is a need to explore the acceptable scope, application and limits within which 
the current system of family dispute resolution can operate in tandem with the Constitution 
and other legislation.22 This research does that by, firstly, investigating whether both statutory 
law and customary law provide a set of criteria for allocating disputes to appropriate 
institutions. Secondly, it looks at factors which qualify and disqualify customary marriage 
institutions of dispute resolution to handle violence disputes.  
1.3 Scope of the Study 
From a broad perspective, the research borders the legal framework of family law dispute 
resolution. From this general standpoint, the study is narrowed down to investigate how the 
methods of customary law dispute resolution impacts on the accessibility of legal remedies 
for women in matrilineal societies. These remedies are limited to those addressing physical 
and sexual marital violence.  
                                                          
17 Ibid.  
18 FEA Sander & L Rozdeiczer ‘Selecting an Appropriate Dispute Resolution Procedure: Detailed Analysis and 
Simplified Solution’ in in ML Moffitt & RC Bordone (eds) The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (2005) 386–
404. 
19 See LG Lerman ‘Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on 
Women’ (1984) 7 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 57; R Field ‘Using the Feminist Critique of Mediation to 
Explore “The Good, The Bad and The Ugly” Implications for Women of the Introduction of Mandatory Family 
Dispute Resolution in Australia’ (2006) 20(5) Australian Journal of Family Law 45–78. 
20 JR Seul ‘Litigation as a Dispute Resolution Alternative’ in ML Moffitt & RC Bordone (eds) The Handbook of 
Dispute Resolution (2005) 35–353. 
21 S 41(2) and 41(3) of the Constitution provide the right to access justice in form of access to courts of law and 
effective legal remedies respectively. 
22 Other legislation includes the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act and the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act 5 of 2006. 
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The focus on marital violence is informed by statistical indicators in other studies that show 
at least constancy in prevalence levels of violence against women in the domestic setting.23 
Lack of prevalence reduction in this area is irrespective of the passing into law of the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in 2006. This research intends to offer possible 
explanations and solutions to this problem by using the analytical tools of dispute resolution 
theories.  
The observations and results of this research are based on marriages formed under the 
matrilineal system of customary law as opposed to the patrilineal system. This is the case 
because there is sufficient literature written on customary law that describes institutions of 
dispute resolution under the matrilineal system. This suits the methodology of desk research 
adopted for this study, bearing in mind time and space limitations. 
Of particular importance to this research is the institution of ankhoswe. Generally, the title 
ankhoswe is given to an adult relative, especially a senior brother or maternal uncle of each 
spouse.24 The ankhoswe’s primary duty is to resolve disputes in marriages by reconciling the 
parties whenever possible.25 The institution of ankhoswe is also mandatorily required for 
validity of customary marriages.26 Based on that reason, its accessibility and usage is 
relatively high compared to other institutions of dispute resolution in customary law 
marriages. It is on this basis that this research focuses its attention on the mechanisms of 
dispute resolution applied by the ankhoswe.  
Mostly, the ankhoswe employ the mechanisms of mediation to resolve disputes between 
spouses.27 In some cases, their role can be arbitrative in nature.28 Whenever used in this 
study, the term ‘ankhoswe dispute resolution’ is meant to refer to all the dispute resolution 
                                                          
23 See M Mellish et al Gender-based Violence in Malawi: A Literature Review to Inform the National Response 
(2015) available at 
https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/436_FINALHPPMalawiGBVLiteratureReview.pdf, accessed on 
8 February 2017; National Statistical Office et al Gender Based Violence Baseline Survey Report (2012). 
24 The title ‘Ankhoswe’ is the plural form of ‘nkhoswe’. It is also used to refer to an individual as a form of 
respect. See LJ Chimango ‘Woman without Ankhoswe in Malawi’ (1977) 15 ALS 54–55; Chilakolako v 
Chilakolako [1978–80] 9 MLR 355; BP Wanda ‘Customary Family Law in Malawi: Adherence to Tradition and 
Adaptability to Change’ (1988) 20:27 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 126–128. 
25 Chilakolako supra note 24. 
26 Mbewe v Nyirenda Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2003 HC (Mzuzu Registry) (Unreported). 
27 Courts usually use terms such as ‘mediate’ or ‘mediation’, ‘conciliation’, and ‘reconcile’ or ‘reconciliation’ in 
reference to the role of ankhoswe in dispute resolution (see Chilakolako supra note 24; NyaLongwe supra note 
8). 
28 In Nyang’ambi supra note 2, it was stated that the ankhoswe have powers to penalise a spouse at fault. 
However, the court did not provide further clarifications on this point. 
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roles assumed by the ankhoswe. Similarly, the terms ‘ankhoswe mediation’ and ‘ankhoswe 
arbitration’ are used to refer to the mediation and arbitration roles of ankhoswe respectively.  
The study appreciates that the dispute resolution duty of ankhoswe is not only relevant to 
disputes in marriages formed under customary law.29 For instance, some couples who 
contract civil marriages choose to include the institution of ankhoswe in their marriages as 
well.30 In other scenarios, the parties may have originally contracted their marriages under 
customary law and later had them converted to civil marriages.31 Although in such situations 
the ankhoswe may not be legally essential, they still continue to help with resolving disputes 
in the marriage.32 Legal principles concerning the role of ankhoswe outlined in such cases are 
also applicable in customary law marriages. These cases will be referred to in this study 
notwithstanding the focus on customary law marriages.  
1.4 Research Question 
The main question this study seeks to answer is: 
Do women married under customary law have access to effective means of dispute resolution 
to remedy marital violence? 
1.4.1 Specific Questions 
To answer the main question, the research is guided by the following specific questions: 
a) Are dispute resolution mechanisms under customary family law regulated to 
handle disputes based on the justice needs of the parties?  
b) Is a single mechanism or legal system of dispute resolution sufficient to provide 
access to justice for women in marital violence?  
c) Does ankhoswe dispute resolution stand as a potential obstacle for women to 
access courts of law?  
                                                          
29 The High Court in several matters has recognised the mediatory role of ankhoswe even in non-customary 
marriages. See Msindo v Msindo Civil Case 67 of 2006 (Principal Registry) available at 
http://old.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court-general-division/2006/15, accessed on 11 May 2016; 
Chilakolako supra note 24. 
30 In Chilakolako supra note 24, the parties were married in terms of the Marriage Act 3 of 1902. However, they 
decided to have marriage advocates (ankhoswe) according to customary law. 
31 Msindo v Msindo Civil Case 67 of 2006 (Principal Registry) available at 
http://old.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court-general-division/2006/15, accessed on 11 May 2016. Note that 
converting a customary marriage into a civil marriage is possible if the customary marriage in question is not 
polygamous as a matter of fact, see Kandoje v Mtengelenji 1964–66 ALR Mal 558. 
32 Chilakolako supra note 24. 
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d) Is ankhoswe dispute resolution a hindrance for women attempting to access legal 
remedies which effectively address the problem of marital violence? 
1.5 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the study is that women married under customary law do not have 
adequate access to effective means of dispute resolution to remedy marital violence. 
1.6 Justification of Study 
There has been significant research which has looked at substantive customary family law in 
the light of the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights.33 However, there has not been 
much research devoted to assessing the procedural rules of dispute resolution in customary 
family law. There is a need to have the methods of customary law dispute resolution tested 
for compatibility with constitutional norms and other legislation. With that aim, this research 
investigates how effective customary law dispute resolution is in promoting the right of 
married women to access effective legal remedies in marital violence disputes.  
1.7 Literature Review  
Legal scholarship in customary family law in Malawi has been mainly focused on appraising 
substantive rules of formalities and validity of marriages.34 This has also been the case with 
the institution of ankhoswe. Commentators had for long questioned the legalistic customary 
rule that a marriage without ankhoswe was invalid.35 The criticism centred on the adverse 
effects which the rigidity of this rule produced. If there were no ankhoswe in the marriage, 
parties were blocked from accessing matrimonial legal remedies they sought.36 
To address this, the law created another type of marriage, which does not involve ankhoswe, 
known as ‘marriage by repute’ or ‘permanent cohabitation’.37 Under this form of marriage, a 
                                                          
33 Mwambene (2009) op cit note 10; L Mwambene Reconciling African customary law with women’s rights in 
Malawi: The proposed Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Bill (2007) 1 Malawi Law Journal 113; K 
Besendahl ‘Negotiating Marriage on the Eve of Human Rights’ (2004) 8(1) African Sociological Review 11–30. 
34 FA Mwale Family and Succession Law in Malawi (2012); DS Koyana et al Customary Marriage Systems in 
Malawi and South Africa (2007); JO Ibik Restatement of African Law: Malawi: 1. The Law of Marriage and 
Divorce (1970). 
35 For a historical discussion of law reform on marriages without ankhoswe see Mbewe v Nyirenda Civil Appeal 
No. 49 of 2003 HC (Mzuzu Registry) (Unreported); see also Chimango op cit note 24; Wanda op cit note 24; M 
Chigawa Customary law and social development: de jure marriages vis-à-vis de facto marriages at customary 
law in Malaŵi (1987) (Unpublished). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Supra note 9. 
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union which lasts for at least five years is a valid marriage if it satisfies certain prescribed 
conditions.38  
 Consequently, the creation of a separate type of marriage has reserved customary marriages, 
their formalities, and their institutions.39 Under customary law the institution of ankhoswe is 
still relevant. It is also central to the resolution of disputes in customary law marriages. To 
this effect, the High Court held that the primary purpose of marriage advocates (ankhoswe) is 
to resolve differences in the marriage and to reconcile the parties if possible.40  
Although this is the case, much of the legal literature has focused only on critical analysis of 
the role of ankhoswe with regard to the validity of marriages. This research seeks to fill the 
gap by taking the question further and looking at the role of ankhoswe in dispute resolution, 
which is their key role. It uses the theory of appropriate dispute resolution to appraise the 
efficacy of the family law justice system in providing legal remedies to end marital violence 
against women married under customary law. 
In addition, this research builds on the works which have looked at customary family law 
generally and its interface with human rights.41 This research adds to this body of knowledge 
by concentrating its attention on how customary family dispute resolution affects women’s 
rights to access justice.  
1.8 Methodology  
This study is a product of desk research. It has drawn its primary sources from case law and 
statutes. The National Traditional Appeal Court (NTAC) decisions inform the study on the 
practice of matrimonial dispute resolution by the traditional court system.  
In addition, High Court decisions have been used to draw a complete picture of the current 
jurisprudence of customary family law dispute resolution. This is significant because the 
traditional court system which had NTAC as its final appellate court was phased out in 
1994.42 Instead of the traditional courts, presently it is the magistrates’ courts which handle 
                                                          
38 S 13 of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
39 S 26 of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
40 Chilakolako supra note 24. 
41 Mwambene (2009) op cit note 10. 
42 See note 13 on the abolition of the traditional courts in 1994 and their pending re-establishment under the 
Local Courts Act No 9 of 2011. 
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customary law marriage disputes. The High Court in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction on 
the magistrates’ courts.43  
This research has also taken advantage of the fact that the role of ankhoswe in resolving 
disputes has been discussed by the High Court in some non-customary law marriage 
proceedings.44 These cases add to the understanding of how the High Court defines and 
appreciates the function of ankhoswe in general.  
The major legislation which has been consulted in this project is the Constitution, the 
Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act, and the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. 
There are a number of secondary sources such as journal articles and textbooks which the 
study has made use of in order to understand the historical context of customary law dispute 
resolution. The research also makes use of literature from journal articles and textbooks in the 
field of dispute resolution theory. With the aid of these sources, chapter 2 discusses the 
models of access to justice and appropriate dispute resolution. These concepts provide a 
comparative ground on which the research tests the theoretical appropriateness of the current 
structure of customary family law dispute resolution.  
There are limitations to the methodology adopted in this study. One of them is that this 
research may not reflect the actual practises of ‘living customary law’45 obtaining in practice 
right now. This is because the study is not based on data from field research. However, this is 
mitigated by the fact that there exist stable principles in customary law which inform the 
changing rules. This research centres on these principles as opposed to the rules which 
change from time to time. In the end, the principles are compared with the prevailing 
circumstances of modern society in order to establish their present relevance and application.  
1.9 Outline  
The study has six chapters. In chapter 2 the discussion focuses on the theoretical methods of 
dispute resolution and their interface with the right to access courts of law and legal remedies. 
                                                          
43 According to section 110(4) of the Constitution, appeals from subordinate courts (which include magistrates’ 
courts) lie to the High Court. 
44 Chilakolako supra note 24; see also Msindo supra note 31. 
45 Living customary law is the law made up of present customs and practices regarded as binding by people of a 
particular ethnicity. See C Himonga & C Bosch ‘The Application of African Customary Law under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 318–
331; see also Besendahl op cit note 33 at 14. Refer to 3.4.2 for further discussion on living customary law. 
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This interface is appraised in the light of the feminist critique on private dispute resolution 
and violence against women.  
Chapter 3 discusses dispute resolution in the context of customary law. It explores how the 
current court system and its conceptualisation of substantive customary law has an impact on 
dispute resolution and accessibility of courts and legal remedies.  
Chapter 4 outlines the legal framework of marital violence and its remedies in Malawi. In 
chapter 5, the analysis shifts to the various features of ankhoswe dispute resolution. These 
features include neutrality and impartiality; confidentiality; and enforceability of agreements. 
These are examined to answer the question whether the ankhoswe have the capacity to handle 
marital violence disputes efficiently and effectively. 
The discussion is closed in chapter 6 with a summary of main observations, followed by 




CHAPTER 2: ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH THE LENS  
OF APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
2.1 Introduction 
In law, rules of procedure are provided as a means of accessing remedial correction of legal 
wrongs. In order to give equal advantage to all people, the procedure needs to be fair and 
available to all without discrimination. Procedural fairness is important in ensuring and 
affirming the equality of every person to access justice in form of legal remedies.46 
This chapter seeks to reflect on how family dispute resolution mechanisms fit in this equation 
of access to justice especially for women. This is done by examining the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks of access to justice and appropriate dispute resolution. In addition, the 
discussion employs the feminist critique in appraising private dispute resolution on marital 
violence disputes.  
2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework for Access to Justice 
2.2.1 Modelling Access to Justice 
Access to justice refers to the ability of every person in society without discrimination to 
access the processes and institutions of enforcing existing rights or laws to obtain appropriate 
remedies.47 This definition implies the availability of laws, institutions and remedies.  
These three elements are the basic features used in modelling access to justice as 
conceptualised in this research. They are termed as normative protection, institutional 
capacity to provide effective remedies, and legal empowerment to seek and obtain 
remedies.48  
Normative protection refers to the availability or existence of legal remedies in the ‘letter’ of 
the law.49 These remedies are provided in statutes or through customary law. Additionally, 
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the law provides the procedure and institutions through which the remedies are obtained. If 
access to justice is to be achieved, both the stipulated remedies and the institutions 
established by the law have to be available as a matter of practical fact.  
In this study, chapter 3 outlines the normative framework of customary family law dispute 
resolution. On the other hand, chapter 4 discusses the legal framework of marital violence 
and remedies available to remedy it. 
The other link in this model focuses on the capacity to provide effective remedies by the 
established institutions.50 At this level, the emphasis shifts from merely having the 
institutions in place to having effective operations running in the institutions.51 As the 
institutions are different, each has to be equipped with a capacity to handle the type of 
grievances for which it is able to offer effective remedies. This is why the discussion in 
chapter 5 addresses the question as to whether the institution of ankhoswe has the capacity to 
resolve marital violence disputes. 
The aim behind building the capacity of these institutions of justice delivery is to improve 
their efficiency and accessibility. The institutions are of no use if the people they intend to 
assist fail to access them. In order to have a complete and effective justice system, the users 
have to be empowered to seek and obtain the available remedies.52 This forms the third level 
of accessing justice in this model.  
At this level, deliberate effort is necessary to assist especially vulnerable groups such as 
women in accessing the institutions and remedies addressing legal wrongs.53 Such efforts 
include provision of legal awareness and legal aid. It is on this basis that this study analyses 
whether in customary family law dispute resolution there are enough safeguards to empower 
women to access legal remedies in disputes involving violence.  
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2.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Appropriate Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) 
2.3.1 Conflict and Dispute Resolution 
Sometimes, conflict resolution and dispute resolution are terms which are used 
interchangeably.54 Strictly, though, these terms can be assigned separate meanings. A conflict 
can refer to the “underlying set of events, facts and relationships forming the backdrop of a 
dispute”.55 A dispute, on the other hand, is usually an extracted event from a conflict 
expressed in legal, social or psychological terms to create a basis of interpreting the 
conflict.56  
In a court setting, in order to resolve the dispute, the court refers to the legal rights of the 
disputants. At times, this process overlooks the actual causes of the conflict which may exist 
outside what is legally relevant. For example, the court may, through the lens of the law, be 
able to apportion blame to the losing party and confirm the position of the winning party. Yet 
it may not be able to resolve the miscommunication of parties due to emotional and 
psychological dysfunction. Although the legal dispute may be resolved in court, the conflict 
remains unsettled.  
With this understanding of the difference between conflicts and disputes, the idea of access to 
justice being limited to accessing a court of law cannot be sustained. The court procedure 
only provides a means of reducing the conflict into a court legal dispute.57 The problem is 
thereby defined within the narrow campus of what the court system recognises as legally 
relevant. As a result, the remedies that can be sought are mostly restricted to the law.  
In the legal system, however, it is not only the court system which redefines a conflict into 
what is legally relevant. Parties in other settings may not define their dispute in the same 
legal language recognised by the court. This does not mean that their dispute is non-legal. 
Customary dispute resolution with its institutions has its own procedures and laws of defining 
what constitutes a legal dispute. What may seem, through a western-designed state court 
system, to be a non-legal dispute may well be a legal dispute in customary law.  
                                                          
54 ML Moffitt & RC Bordone ‘Perspectives on Dispute Resolution: An Introduction’ in ML Moffitt & RC 
Bordone (eds) The Handbook of Dispute Resolution (2005) 1. 
55 A Nylund ‘Access to Justice: Is ADR a Help or Hindrance?’ in L Ervo & A Nylund (eds) The Future of Civil 





The idea of ‘deep legal pluralism’58 helps to provide a theoretical framework for considering 
dispute resolution procedures outside the confines of state dispute resolution processes. It 
recognises various types of legal orders or systems in a particular society without classifying 
some as superior to others.59 This should be contrasted with ‘state law pluralism’, which 
aligns different types of ‘laws’ or ‘legal systems’ in a single hierarchical setup.60 For 
example, under the Traditional Courts Act, customary law was subordinate to statutory law.61 
In the context of dispute resolution, this means that non-state or informal dispute 
management procedures were subject to state law. 
However, this study adopts the understanding of deep legal pluralism. It views customary law 
institutions of dispute resolution and statutory institutions as equally legitimate. It further 
argues that these two systems apart from being equally legitimate should operate to 
complement each other to offer appropriate dispute resolution. In this regard, accessing 
customary law institutions such as that of the ankhoswe by a disputing couple should be 
considered in principle as also accessing a valid legal forum, such as a court. The fact that the 
approach in these forums differs in terms of procedures, claims, and goals for resolving 
disputes does not make either of the two systems less legal.  
Both the court and such customary law institutions are the creations of the law for dispute 
resolution. Both are meant to give disputants an opportunity to access justice. Just as a day in 
court on its own does not imply access to justice, a session of conciliation with ankhoswe 
does not mean automatic access to justice. The answer to the question as to whether a person 
has access to justice depends on whether his/her justice needs have been met successfully. 
This will always have to be measured with the quality of remedies a party has been able to 
access to resolve a particular dispute. 
Both statutory law and customary law court litigation may be suitable to provide remedies in 
matrimonial disputes where there is less chance for reconciliation. An estranged divorced 
couple may need the final word of a judge in distributing their jointly owned property. 
Matters which require legal compulsion to ensure compliance also fall within the ambit of the 
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court to provide remedies. For example, the state has an interest to punish offenders who 
physically abuse their spouses.  
However, these remedies are not the only justice needs sought by disputing couples. In other 
cases, married couples seek to protect and promote an ongoing relationship with each other 
and their children. In such matters, their justice needs are met with relational justice.  
2.3.2 The Place of Relational Justice in Family Dispute Resolution 
The satisfaction by a disputant that justice has happened “through cooperative behaviour, 
agreement, negotiation or dialogue among actors in a [conflict] situation”62 is referred to as 
relational justice. It works on the principle of identifying and accommodating the interests of 
all parties in a conflict.63 The role of the third party in achieving relational justice is to 
increase the capacity of the parties to balance self-interest against the interests of others.64 
These interests are determined by the parties themselves through a joint analysis of the 
conflict. The philosophy behind relational justice is that legal positions and demands are mere 
outward expressions of deeper needs and interests.65 Instead of dividing the parties as winners 
and losers of a legal battle, relational justice seeks to maintain the relational ties of the parties 
by concentrating on joint problem solving.66 
Therefore, relational justice is vital when dealing with conflicts where the parties need to 
maintain coexistence. In marriages, where after the dispute is resolved the couple is to live 
closely together, this type of win-win mechanism is important. Even in cases where the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down and divorce is certain, relational justice has a place in 
resolving such disputes. This is because the parties may have children who will require their 
parents’ joint cooperation in meeting their needs after divorce.67  
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On the other hand, litigation which is based on competitive or distributive justice is criticised 
for disempowering and alienating parties, thereby escalating the conflict.68 As a result, this 
adversarial approach to family dispute resolution brings unjust consequences upon other 
background victims of the conflict like children.69 
There is a need for a system of family dispute resolution which recognises that justice needs 
vary from one dispute to another. The appropriateness of a dispute resolution mechanism 
should be measured against its capacity to meet specific justice needs of the parties. It is 
significant, then, to understand how different methods of dispute resolution relate to different 
types of justice. 
2.3.3 Categories of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
One of the ways of classifying dispute resolution processes is based on the presence and the 
role of a third party assisting the disputants.70 Within this classification there are two major 
stems: third-party processes and non-third-party processes.71 In the latter, parties settle their 
dispute without involving a third party. Negotiation falls into this category of dispute 
resolution.  
There is a further categorisation of dispute resolution mechanisms which require the presence 
of a third party. There are three major processes identified as making up this category. These 
are determinative, advisory and facilitative processes.72 In determinative processes, a third 
party investigates a dispute and makes a decision as to its resolution. This decision, in most 
cases, is enforceable through court procedure. Examples of such processes include arbitration 
and litigation. 
As to advisory processes, third parties are involved to give advice after examining the facts of 
the dispute.73 Furthermore, their role may extend to giving advice on possible and desirable 
outcomes.74 Evaluative and therapeutic mediation are examples in this category.75 
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Facilitative mediation is an example of the last category of third-party dispute resolution, 
known as facilitative processes. Here, third parties are involved to help bridge the 
communication gap between or among parties in conflict.76 The aim is to get parties into 
meaningful dialogue so that they can find their own solutions to the dispute. 
Facilitative and advisory processes are suitable where the disputants’ needs are more focused 
on relational justice. These methods are appropriate where parties want to preserve an 
ongoing relationship or where they are interested in terminating the relationship amicably.77 
This is what makes these processes apposite in marriage disputes. They are used to preserve 
family ties which in some cases do not involve only parents, but children as well.  
In contrast, determinative processes such as litigation set spouses against each other.78 Instead 
of cultivating cooperation, they encourage polarised thinking. Such adversarial dispute 
resolution in turn erodes meaningful communication between the parties. Nevertheless, the 
necessity of determinative processes cannot be completely ruled out in family dispute 
resolution. In cases where the marriage has evidently broken down, binding determinations 
by a third party are necessary. Because of its finality and coercive nature, litigation should be 
employed where there is threat to life or limb.79 In such cases, insistence for mediation may 
be a way of hindering or delaying access to justice.80  
Therefore, understanding the suitability of one process of dispute resolution over another in a 
particular dispute is necessary to improve access to justice.81 Methods of dispute resolution 
should be used with an appreciation of their appropriateness to resolve disputes only in 
certain matters. A family dispute resolution system based on this principle will acknowledge 
that not all cases are appropriate for resolution in one process.  
2.3.4 Appropriate Dispute Resolution 
Historically, the abbreviation ADR had been coined to represent ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution’.82 This term has been subjected to criticisms for a number of reasons. One of 
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them is that the word ‘alternative’ fails to encompass the interrelations between various 
methods of dispute resolution as a harmonious system.83 It portrays mechanisms of dispute 
resolution as mutually exclusive. The picture which the word ‘alternative’ paints is that at a 
given time one has to use one method of dispute resolution to the exclusion of other methods. 
This is not true because in practice some parties who are litigating before a civil court 
continue to negotiate or mediate their disputes. 
Instead of ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’, this research adopts the concept of ‘Appropriate 
Dispute Resolution’.84 In this vein, ADR is conceptualised as a comprehensive term covering 
all processes of dispute or conflict management.85 It is a range of various procedures for 
solving disputes. In this range, some of the processes are effective when used to resolve only 
a certain category of disputes.86 Thus, no one method of dispute resolution on its own is a 
solution for achieving efficiency in accessing justice.87 
In ‘Appropriate Dispute Resolution’, the goal shifts from merely providing ‘alternatives’ to 
offering of multi processes of dispute resolution to optimise access to justice.88 Therefore, 
ADR is undermined when disputants are restricted to one particular process. Aligning 
processes in a procedural strand for disputants to try one method before the other may have a 
similar effect.  
For instance, in many jurisdictions, mediation as a general rule is mandatory before a civil 
matter can be litigated.89 By mandating mediation the idea of appropriate dispute resolution 
can lose meaning as the system assumes that mediation is appropriate in all such cases. 
Reducing ADR to a concept of finding an alternative to litigation, and when such alternative 
is always compulsory mediation, destroys the value and efficacy of other methods of dispute 
resolution. 
Appropriate Dispute Resolution presumes that parties are able to select the process which 
best matches their needs based on the type of dispute in question. This creates the need for 
the disputants to have information on the processes available, together with their advantages 
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and disadvantages.90 The lack of such information handicaps the parties from being able to 
choose an appropriate mechanism of dispute resolution. Such ignorance contributes to 
inequality in accessing the justice system. 
2.4 The Realm of Family Dispute Resolution and the Feminist Critique 
The question as to which family dispute resolution mechanisms are appropriate for women 
has attracted a lot of feminist scholarship.91 This section provides the criticism that feminism 
levels against non-court family dispute resolution processes. Before surveying the feminist 
critique, the discussion examines mediation processes involved in family dispute resolution. 
These are compared with the methods used by the ankhoswe. 
2.4.1 Models of Family Mediation 
Mediation is defined as “the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, 
impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist 
disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in 
dispute”92.  
Family mediation can be facilitative, evaluative or therapeutic. In facilitative mediation, the 
aim is at managing the settlement process to help the disputants make decisions about their 
interests in the dispute.93 The mediator is expected help the parties to use effective means of 
communication in the process of mediation.94 The main objective of facilitative mediation is 
to refocus the parties’ attention from their opposed demands to their needs and interests. This 
is why it is also known as interest based or problem solving mediation.95  
Owing to minimal intervention by the mediator on the substance and results of mediation, 
there is a likelihood of dedication to the settlement reached through facilitative mediation 
because it is a reflection of the wishes of the parties.96 This in turn means that there is less 
need for external monitoring to enforce the agreement. This minimal intervention comes with 
disadvantages as well. Facilitative mediation loses the opportunity of bringing in the 
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objective voice of a third party in the content of the agreement. Since the decision-making 
process on the content of settlement lies with the parties, they may well make decisions 
which ignore other affected persons such as children.  
There is also danger of perpetuating power imbalances in facilitative mediation.97 The ability 
of an abused wife to contribute objectively to the content of the settlement may be 
jeopardised by the fear of re-experiencing violence after the mediation session. This problem 
is compounded where the wife is largely dependent on the husband economically.  
Evaluative mediation, however, goes beyond managing the process. It differs from facilitative 
mediation in that evaluative mediators give advice both on the process and the results of the 
dispute.98 As a result of this role, the mediator runs the risk of being perceived as interfering 
with the parties’ autonomy to work out their own preferred solutions.  
As for therapeutic mediation, its aim is to deal with the underlying causes of the couple’s 
dispute.99 Mostly mediators who provide this form of mediation have expertise in 
counselling. The role of such mediators is to improve the relationship of the disputants by 
diagnosing and treating their relationship problems.100 With this interest in restoring 
relationships, therapeutic mediation is also known as reconciliation or transformative 
mediation.101  
Lastly, it should be noted that some of the mediation processes may involve, directly or 
indirectly, contributing to the terms of any agreement made. However, this does not extend to 
making determinative decisions as it does in adjudicative processes. 
2.4.2 The Model of Ankhoswe Dispute Resolution 
In customary family law, it may not be possible to assign a single model of mediation to the 
work of ankhoswe. Like other mediators, the ankhoswe use a combined range of models of 
mediation depending on the circumstances. Their role includes providing counselling and 
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advice to the couple.102 The goal of ankhoswe mediation is similar to that of therapeutic 
mediation. Their aims and efforts are centred on reconciling the parties.103  
The role of ankhoswe to reconcile married couples in conflict can be taken to negative 
extremes at times. Influenced by cultural beliefs which advocate that marriage must be 
persevered with, women are encouraged to endure very difficult situations, including 
violence.104 In other traditions a husband’s physical violence against his wife is justified on 
the basis of disciplining her.105 The likelihood of exerting pressure on a victimised wife to 
persevere is high where the ankhoswe accept as valid such cultural beliefs. Some view these 
beliefs as the position of customary law.106  
However, there is always the danger of confusing prevalent cultural practices with customary 
law. Customary law is concerned with what the people of a particular ethnicity in a specific 
time period regard as binding practices.107 It constantly adapts to changing socio-economic 
circumstances.108 As old customary norms came into contact with religious norms, socio-
economic changes and constitutional imperatives, they produced customary law that is 
binding today.109 Given the current legal framework, it could be misplaced to hold the view 
that customary law still considers it legal for men to discipline their wives by beating them.110  
In other scenarios, the ankhoswe seem to have some arbitrative powers. They are said to have 
powers to make authoritative directions which include penalising the spouse at fault.111 The 
possibilities of how the ankhoswe were able to maintain a position of influence in the past in 
enforcing their awards are discussed in chapter 5.  
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Currently, some general factors which compel parties to comply with the advice of ankhoswe 
include social pressure.112 A wife may also observe the directions of the ankhoswe, fearing 
that disobedience may give her husband a ground for dissolving the marriage.113 Similarly, a 
party who is at fault for the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage at customary law is liable 
to compensate the other.114 Disobedience to ankhoswe may be taken into account as one of 
the factors in establishing that fault. 
2.4.3 The Feminist Critique 
Unlike mediation and ankhoswe dispute resolution, litigation coercively intervenes to 
regulate the conduct of individuals.115 It has the ability to compel the wrongdoer to comply 
with orders and directions of the court. This is done irrespective of his or her unwillingness to 
co-operate with court procedure. 
The question of what gives the state the legitimacy to intervene coercively on the conduct of 
its citizens has given rise to various thought systems. In response to this question, liberalism 
came up with the public/private dichotomy.116 This dichotomy proposes that the state’s realm 
of conduct regulation is public life as opposed to private life.117 Intervention in the private 
realm should be exercised over free and equal adult individuals only with their consent. Since 
the marriage institution represents a private contractual agreement between two adult persons, 
the state is asked to act with restraint towards it.118 
This divide, however, influences the state’s discriminatory intervention on conduct 
suppressive to women in families.119 For example, by minimising intervention in the family 
sphere, the state fails to end the oppression of women which happens behind closed doors. 
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This non-intervention of the state in the private sphere is, in turn, regarded as ‘patriarchal 
conspiracy’ to cover the crimes of men against women.120  
The feminist demand is to eliminate this wall between the private and the public. This process 
is calculated to enlarge the social and legal latitude in protecting women. In reconstructing 
the family as a public sphere, the aim is to expose private oppression of women to public 
criticism. Therefore, the state is called upon to be actively involved in the regulation of 
family conduct and the application of justice to disputes arising out of it.121  
It is on this theoretical basis that the private nature of non-court family dispute resolution has 
also been at the centre of criticism by the feminist thought. Family mediation is condemned 
for lack of power to cut off marital violence against women.122 In cases involving physical 
abuse, the violent party is protected, through non-court dispute resolution, from public 
scrutiny and legal sanctions.123 Ironically, if the same violence occurred between strangers, 
the dispute is subjected to public trial in criminal proceedings. 
In addition, private justice fails in curbing violence against women because it lacks legal 
compulsion and precedent.124 The unavailability of punitive threats to back resolutions 
reached in mediation or reconciliation leaves women vulnerable to further abuse. Similarly, 
the deterring effect of legal precedents is lost when dispute resolution is transferred from the 
hands of the court into the confidentiality of non-court processes.  
The other challenge of private dispute resolution as perceived by feminism is that through it, 
women are socialised to accept violence as what is to be expected. This has been explained 
through the theory of ‘learned helplessness’.125 Having endured repeated incidents of marital 
violence, women are psychologically prepared to accept abusive behaviour as normal. 
Promises made by the husband after each repeated incident of abuse condition victims of 
marital violence to hope for positive behavioural change.  
In mediation, these promises are reinforced as genuine. The victimised wife is made to 
endure violence with hope that her spouse will change. As the violence becomes more 
frequently repeated in various marriages,  women gradually become conditioned to treat 
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cases of life-threatening marital violence as normal cases for settlement through non-coercive 
dispute resolution.  
2.4.4 In Search of a Balance 
The concerns raised by the feminist ideology are not without responses. The first of them is 
that non-court mechanisms do not make court processes inaccessible.126 For instance, in 
jurisdictions where mandatory mediation is practiced, parties are not necessarily obligated to 
reach an agreement through mediation. The mandate is that they should go for mediation 
before litigation. 
The second response is that a party using a non-court dispute resolution method may 
simultaneously access the court process.127 A victim of marital violence can apply for a 
protection order and still opt for a non-court process at the same time. 
These suggested answers to the feminists’ critique on private dispute resolution should be 
considered in the context of a particular jurisdiction. In systems where mediation is 
mandatory, parties incur costs if they bypass mediation. During the traditional courts regime, 
neglect to take a matter before ankhoswe was used as evidence against the veracity of such 
party’s claims.128 In order to satisfy the procedure of undergoing mediation before trial a 
disputant may be forced to participate in an inappropriate dispute resolution process.129  
Moreover, if non-court processes are mandated without screening, they hinder violence 
victims from accessing courts’ remedies in time. In other cases, disputants accept ineffective 
settlements due to ignorance. This makes it necessary for the justice system to have a 
screening mechanism of appropriateness beyond party autonomy.130 Through screening, 
disputes with relational justice demands should be directed to facilitative and advisory 
mechanisms. The courts should, however, retain matters where there is a need for 
determinative and coercive powers to be employed to safeguard compliance and to protect 
women from violence.  
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Viewed broadly, access to justice is not limited to accessing courts. Different demands for 
justice require different modes of dispute resolution. Customary family law dispute resolution 
in itself is neither a bar nor an open door for married women suffering violence to access 
remedies. The issue of whether ankhoswe mediation is an appropriate mode of dispute 
resolution has to do with the context in terms of the type of cases the system can handle and 
how it relates with other justice systems like the courts. This is examined in detail in Chapters 
4 and 5. The next chapter sets up the framework of conceptualising family dispute resolution 




CHAPTER 3: APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
IN THE CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY LAW  
3.1 Introduction 
The concept of ADR, as noted in chapter 2, involves the provision of various processes for 
resolving disputes. The understanding is that one method of dispute resolution cannot provide 
access to justice for resolving all types of matters. It was further observed that ADR as 
‘Appropriate Dispute Resolution’ is undermined when disputants are restricted to one 
particular process.  
This chapter argues that ADR under customary law is incomplete because parties are 
provided with a court system which is far removed from their cultural context. This situation 
is caused by the absence of traditional courts. As a result of the absence of these courts, 
parties are forced to redirect their disputes which are suitable for courts’ resolution to other 
forums of dispute resolution such as the ankhoswe.  
The chapter also looks at the effect of conceptualising customary law as either ‘official 
customary law’ or ‘living customary law’ on women’s rights. It argues that, unlike official 
customary law, the concept of living customary law equips dispute resolution with a better 
environment to deal with marital violence. 
3.2 Institutions of Family Dispute Resolution 
Couples married under customary law can access various institutions to resolve their 
disputes. Some of these institutions include the ankhoswe, traditional authorities (chiefs), 
religious authorities, the Police Service, and the courts. There is also provision for the 
establishment of a Family Counselling Panel under the Marriage, Divorce and Family 
Relations Act.131 If established, the Panel’s obligation will be to prevent and to address, 
through counselling, cases of family misconduct.132 
The Malawi Police Service offers counselling to couples through the department of Victim’s 
Support Unit (VSU).133 The VSU mediates with the aim to reconcile couples in disputes 
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which are misdemeanours.134 Criminal charges are supposed to be instituted where the 
dispute involves serious forms of violence.135  
Ordinarily, parties consult religious authorities when ankhoswe dispute resolution has failed. 
However, the ankhoswe and chiefs are dominant methods of customary law marriage dispute 
resolution especially in rural areas.136 They are easily accessible because people are 
acquainted with their practices and procedures.137 The chiefs are also within easy reach in 
terms of distance.138 This is not the case with the courts. The magistrates’ courts which are 
courts of first instance are largely inaccessible due to long distance and use of unfamiliar 
procedures.139  
3.3 The Relationship between Litigation and Other Methods of Dispute Resolution 
ADR requires parties’ participation in choosing a process which best matches their needs 
according to the type of dispute in question. In reality, not all people have the knowledge of 
how various methods of dispute resolution work. This makes it necessary for the state to 
make available information on the processes of dispute resolution and their advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Parties are then enabled to make informed choices by making evaluations to find effective 
means of resolving their dispute. The decision whether to continue with mediation or proceed 
to court, or to use both processes, requires comparison.140 Disputants make calculations on 
whether the law as applied in litigation will yield better results than a settlement reached 
through mediation.141  
In customary family law, it can be expected that parties proceed to court if they perceive that 
court justice is better than the ankhoswe settlement. In other words, where the advantages of 
pursuing trial are minimal, parties are likely to stick with the ankhoswe settlement or engage 
with another process perceived as better than court proceedings. 
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Arguably, perceptions of court’s justice are affected by the type of law which the courts are 
applying. In the particular case of women in customary law marriages, their choice to access 
courts may depend on whether the customary family law being applied in those courts 
promotes their welfare. It is therefore significant that we look at some of the general 
principles of customary law which are applied in the court system in Malawi. 
3.4 General Principles of Customary Law 
3.4.1 Customary Law in Space and Time 
Customary law is conceptualised in terms of its geographical application and validity in time. 
The General Interpretations Act defines it as “the customary law applicable in the area 
concerned”.142 The understanding is that customary law differs from one area to another 
across the country.  
However, customary law cannot be confined to space only. Its validity in terms of time is 
equally important as customary law changes with passage of time. This is the reason why the 
Courts Act provides that customary law should be treated as a question of fact for purposes of 
proof.143 Courts are enjoined to admit the evidence of experts and persons whom they 
consider to be conversant with the customary law of that time.144 
This notwithstanding, there is also provision for the courts to refer to comparable case law in 
determining the applicable customary law.145 Section 64 of the Courts Act provides that “a 
court may judicially note any decisions of its own or of any superior court” in “determining 
the customary law applicable in a like case”. Within the context of this provision, lower 
courts make reference to the decisions of superior courts as a source of customary law.146 
This, though, has the potential of creating time validity problems of the customary law being 
applied.  
The issue is, should the provision be interpreted as creating the common law doctrine of 
precedent? Binding lower courts to apply the customary law established by superior courts 
implies limiting the capacity of the former to implement changes in customary law. Instead of 
giving effect to the customary law obtaining directly from principles rooted in social practice, 
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lower courts may be forced to comply with binding precedent. This, in turn, creates a rigid 
system of customary law which is unresponsive to societal changes.  
The High Court in interpreting this provision in Kishindo v Kishindo147 held that “under … 
section 64 of the Courts Act148, customary law has to be established by evidence and the High 
Court and the Supreme Court will create a binding precedent on customary law”.149 Yet, in 
the same case, the court stated the function of courts in customary law matters as one of 
establishing the “customary law exigent at a given point in time”.150  
Binding precedent puts courts of first instance under an obligation to apply coded rules of 
customary law until such a time as the High Court shall create new precedent. Unfortunately, 
only a few customary law marriage matters proceed on appeal to the High Court. This affects 
the application of society’s changed rules of customary law because the old ‘court-created’ 
rules remain valid as well.  
This application of customary law, codified through case law or legislation, fails to reflect 
current social-economic circumstances. It disables women from fully enforcing and enjoying 
their rights because in applying the rules derived from old customary law, courts are stuck to 
standards which were largely influenced by patriarchal values. The discussion in the next 
section briefly looks at this point by comparing the concept of official customary law with 
that of living customary law. 
3.4.2 Official Customary Law and Living Customary Law  
The codified version of customary law is referred to as official customary law.151 Its sources 
include statutes, case law, and government documents. This type of customary law has a 
number of drawbacks. As already pointed out, patriarchal dominance has had its hand on 
it.152 Traditional and other African leaders, who were predominantly male, interpreted 
customary law to suit patriarchal ideas.153 Coupled with the common law system of 
precedent, these ideas entrenched male domination principles in official customary law.154  
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Secondly, the origin of official customary law is associated with colonialism.155 In the eyes of 
colonial rulers, customary law was regarded as inferior.156 It was subjected to common law 
principles and jurisprudence. Through this exercise, what remains on the official documents 
as customary law is but a creation of colonialism and not the actual norms derived from the 
practices of the people.157  
On the other hand, living customary law is the law made up of present customs and practices 
regarded as binding by people of a particular ethnicity.158 To use the words of the High Court 
in Kishindo,159 it is the “customary law exigent at a given point in time”.160 It is derived from 
what people do and believe they ought to do as opposed to what the officials of the state law 
consider they should do or believe.161 
Contrary to the rigidity of official customary law, living customary law is flexible and 
dynamic.162 It constantly adapts to respond to changes in the economy, religion and the 
Constitution.163 Owing to this adaptability, living customary law has greater potential to 
accommodate women's rights than official customary law.164 For this reason, living 
customary law is better placed to resonate with the ideals of the Constitution and it can easily 
be used to eradicate violence against women.  
Therefore, in looking at ADR in customary law, it is significant to give effect to what living 
customary law is. One of the measures of judging the appropriateness of customary law 
dispute resolution in marital violence disputes is its validity in time. The question of time 
requires not only a comparative investigation of the past and present rules of customary law. 
It further demands a comprehensive analysis of how customary law can effectively apply in 
modern social context.  
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One way of achieving this is to understand the rationale behind the old rules of customary 
law. The idea is to identify the general principle which informed the rules.165 As society 
undergoes changes, the rules are to be applied to give effect to the aims and purposes of the 
overarching principle.166  
Regarding ankhoswe, the following questions can be asked to uncover living customary law: 
What interests were the ankhoswe supposed to protect? Are those interests constitutional? Is 
it possible to protect the same interests by using the old rules of customary law? Are there 
changes in society which make the old rules of customary law ineffective? In what ways can 
those interests be protected effectively in modern society?  
These questions are explored in chapter 5 to establish whether ankhoswe dispute resolution 
has the capacity to provide effective remedies in marital violence disputes. In the next section 
the discussion looks at how the lack of implementation of constitutional provisions regarding 
the right to culture contributes to inefficiency in customary law dispute resolution.  
3.5 The Cultural Aspect of Customary Law Dispute Resolution  
Delivery of services to meet a particular need should be motivated by demand. As a service, 
dispute resolution is not an exception to this principle. Statistically, the largest population of 
Malawians contract their marriages under customary law.167 Provisions of customary law 
dispute resolution ought to match this fact. Unfortunately, this is not the case in practice 
because of the absence of a court system that is dominantly customary law orientated. This 
not only undermines the right of rural people to access justice but it also breaches the 
Constitution’s provisions which advocate for an open and culturally diverse society.  
3.5.1 The Right to Participate in the Cultural Life of One’s Choice 
In the application and development of customary law the Constitution is the primary 
reference point. It is necessary to look at how this supreme law outlines the basic framework 
upon which a system of appropriate dispute resolution in customary family law can operate. 
The Constitution mandates the state to develop policies and pass laws aimed at promoting 
non-adversarial means of settling disputes.168 It recognises negotiation, good offices, 
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mediation, conciliation, and arbitration as mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes.169 
It further provides for both the establishment of the court system170 and the right of every 
person to access such courts for final settlement of legal issues.171  
Recognising the presence of cultural diversity, the Constitution provides for the right of every 
person to participate in the cultural life of one’s choice.172 This right provides justification for 
the establishment and development of customary law dispute resolution institutions.173 Thus, 
these institutions enable people married under customary law to resolve their disputes within 
their cultural setting. To this effect, provision in the constitution for the establishment of 
traditional/local courts within the judiciary reflects this principle.174 
Despite Parliament passing the Local Courts Act in the year 2011, there is currently no local 
court operating in Malawi. The legislation was not assented to by the Presidency.175 This 
poses challenges to the administration of customary law justice. For example, magistrates’ 
courts, which assume the roles intended to be played by the local courts, were designed to 
administer a type of justice influenced by English law.176  
Unlike the procedure used in magistrates’ courts, customary law forums are inquisitorial.177 
The role of the chief is not that of a disinterested, passive third party. The chief takes a 
proactive role in managing the trial by freely asking questions of participants without being 
perceived as biased.178 This runs in contradiction to the common law adversarial procedure 
which is used in the courts of Malawi.  
Furthermore, the levels of formality in terms of paperwork, the use of English language by 
judicial officers, and the use of adversarial procedure challenges the claim that magistrates’ 
courts apply customary law.179 The current situation begs the question whether magistrates’ 
courts have customary law jurisdiction to handle customary law marriage disputes. Although 
statutory provisions may confer on them power to administer customary law, it may be that 
customary law does not recognise them as valid forums of dispute resolution. As such, many 
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rural people seek justice before chiefs and other forums instead of the courts. In turn, this 
perpetuates a trend of privatising justice from state regulation since couples direct their 
marital violence disputes to non-state forums.  
The appropriateness of the ankhoswe dispute resolution should also be considered in this 
light. The choice to submit before ankhoswe all manner of disputes may not be a direct 
indication of approbation of the system by the parties. It may be the result of having an 
incomplete customary law dispute resolution system which leaves people with no practical 
option but to seek redress from ankhoswe and the chiefs. It is not surprising that the special 
Commission on the Review of Traditional Courts Act conceded that the absence of local 
courts has contributed to the denial of access to justice.180  
3.5.2 The Right to Access Courts and Remedies within the Diversity of Cultures 
Providing access to justice to a culturally diverse society requires giving equal attention to the 
practices of dispute resolution of different cultures. Customary law mechanisms of dispute 
resolution and the adversarial procedure prevailing in the magistrates’ courts represent two 
cultural conceptualisations of handling disputes. By providing only one cultural system of 
dispute resolution, the state fails, as a duty bearer, to provide a level ground where people of 
all cultures should enjoy their right to access justice.181  
As a social service, dispute resolution happens within a cultural context. It serves people who 
speak a particular language and conceptualise justice in a specific way. The current court 
system in Malawi does not reflect this basic fact. People especially from rural areas find its 
procedures complex.182 Its English law-orientated mechanisms are an obstruction for 
disputants married under customary law to access courts’ remedial action against marital 
violence. This is because the individualistic conceptualisation of justice in western culture is 
opposed to the community-orientated type of justice reflected in customary law.183 For 
instance, the parties in a customary law forum may not be restricted to the wife and husband. 
Other relatives are incorporated in the dispute resolution process, not only as witnesses but as 
important stakeholders who give their input to find a solution to the dispute.184 
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Therefore, parties who are culturally orientated to participate in a court process based on 
customary law adjudication find the procedure in magistrates’ courts alienating. The absence 
of support and intervention from relatives and the community in settling the dispute is likely 
to be disappointing to rural people who cannot afford the western version of having legal 
support such as legal representation. As such, the only realistic option for customary law-
orientated disputants is to take their matters for resolution before the chiefs and the 
ankhoswe, where the procedure suits their expectations. The problem is that these forums are 
not equipped with enforcement mechanism to check marital violence effectively.185 
In order to uphold and respect the right of women to access justice, the state has to restructure 
the court system to suit cultural context. This can be done by re-establishing the local courts 
as provided under the Constitution and the Local Courts Act. To fulfil their purpose, the 
procedure in these courts will have to be simplified to make it easy for rural citizens to access 
them. Although such courts will have to reflect the customary law-procedures of resolving 
disputes, they need not be passive in dealing with marital violence. The presiding court 
officers can be trained to take a proactive role in making available various remedies to 
resolve disputes effectively.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Courts are established to serve people and primarily to address local challenges. A court 
which has the capacity to provide legal remedies but is inaccessible is of no use to society. 
Yet to an extent this is the position of the court system in Malawi, as it hinders people’s 
access to courts’ remedies with colonial procedures and language. Alienated from 
magistrates’ courts, women married under customary law are compelled to seek remedies 
from friendlier institutions which lack the capacity to handle marital violence. This brings in 
a note of discord in the constitutional harmony of the principles of access to justice, cultural 
diversity, and non-discrimination. 
In addition, official customary law limits the capacity of magistrates to invoke and apply 
updated rules of living customary law. Stuck within the rigidity of codified rules, these courts 
are prone to restate colonial and patriarchal principles that do not support the welfare of 
women.  
There is an urgent need, then, to reconstruct the court system by reintroducing local courts to 
improve access to effective legal remedies. Applying living customary law in those courts 
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will likely increase the flexibility of presiding officers to protect women’s interests. This may 
in turn improve women’s perception of court justice. Instead of being forced to choose 
ankhoswe mediation because of failure to access courts’ remedies, the ankhoswe may be 
employed to complement those remedies. This conceptualisation of dispute resolution as a 
system of complementary efforts when dealing with marital violence brings efficiency. The 




CHAPTER 4: MARITAL VIOLENCE, REMEDIES  
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
4.1 Introduction 
The model of access to justice discussed in chapter 2 places the existence of a legal 
framework as the basic starting point. The expectation is that the law provides for the rights 
and remedies before people can claim them. In addition, the same law must provide for the 
institutions through which people can seek redress for breach of their rights. This chapter 
outlines some of the legal remedies that are available to address physical and sexual marital 
violence. 
It was also noted in chapter 2 that in a legal system which embraces a plurality of dispute 
resolution mechanisms, there is need for screening. The justice system must allocate disputes 
to ADR institutions according to their appropriateness in providing effective remedies. In this 
chapter, the focus is also on establishing whether the law in Malawi provides for a framework 
to ensure that women who are physically and sexually abused by their husbands are 
channelled to the appropriate forums of dispute resolution.  
4.2 Legal Framework of Marital Violence and Remedies 
Within the context of family law, violence can refer to various actions or inactions that cause 
harm to health and wellbeing of a person. This research focuses on marital violence. In other 
words, the study is looking at violence within the marriage setting, thus, between husbands 
and wives. From this viewpoint, marital violence is defined as any abusive conduct between 
husbands and wives that inflicts physical, physiological, or sexual harm to those in that 
relationship.186  
The idea of marital violence is different from the broader concept of family or domestic 
violence. The latter includes other players like children. The understanding is that marital 
violence is a subunit of domestic violence. Hence, the relationship between a husband and 
wife among others qualifies as a domestic relationship within which domestic violence can be 
committed.187 
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From an international human rights perspective, Malawi has committed itself to eliminate 
violence against women.188 This commitment is evident in its domestic legislation dealing 
with marital and domestic violence. There are various remedies which these laws prescribe to 
spouses victimised by marital violence. The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act189 and the 
Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act190 are the major legislation which outline these 
remedies and the procedure through which they can be obtained.191 The remedies that form 
part of this research are: obtaining a protection order; achieving behavioural change through 
counselling and other ADR mechanisms; judicial separation; and divorce. 
4.2.1 The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act  
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act aims at preventing domestic violence from 
occurring and offering protection to persons affected by it.192 Domestic violence refers to 
“any criminal offence arising out of physical, sexual, emotional or psychological, social, 
economic or financial abuse committed by a person against another person within a domestic 
relationship.”193 
In this research, emphasis is on physical and sexual violence. The former includes “any act or 
omission which causes or is intended to cause physical injury or reasonable apprehension of 
physical injury”.194 Sexual abuse, on the other hand, means “sexual contact of any kind that is 
made by force or threat”.195 It also encompasses the commission of or attempt to commit 
sexual offences.196  
Under the Act, the law empowers victimised spouses to apply for an order of the court 
protecting them from potential or further violence.197 This remedy can be obtained as an 
interim or absolute relief.198 If granted, the court has power to impose on the respondent 
various directions of restraint or specific performance.199 For instance, the court can order the 
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respondent to pay a fine for any further violent conduct perpetrated against the applicant.200 
The respondent can also be restrained from occupying or staying in a specified household or 
residential area.201 In exercising these powers, the court has wide discretion to order the 
respondent to comply with any other condition which the court deems necessary for the 
effective protection of the applicant.202  
The application for protection order can be heard and granted irrespective of the existence of 
other proceedings.203 Therefore, a victimised spouse can apply for a protection order 
alongside proceedings of divorce or judicial separation. In the same spirit, the court can order 
that the parties receive family counselling in addition to the protection order.204 Consent is 
required from the applicant where the court makes this order on its own volition.205 
Otherwise, the court cannot impose the order of counselling unless it is applied for by the 
applicant.206  
The orders of the court under this Act are backed up by an enforcement mechanism. The 
court is empowered to impose a fine of up to MK500 000 where a person fails to comply with 
its orders or directions.207 Similarly, under the Courts Act, contempt of court is punishable by 
fine and imprisonment depending on circumstances.208  
4.2.2 The Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act 
Under the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act, the only ground for divorce is 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage.209 This ground can be proved by adducing evidence 
before the court which demonstrates that the marriage has irretrievably broken down because 
of the conduct of the respondent. One of the types of conduct which can be used as evidence 
to prove this condition is cruelty.210  
However, the Act does not define cruelty. This research adopts the comprehensive definition 
of cruelty provided in civil marriage case law before the enactment of the Act because it 
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covers all the aspects of marital violence under this study.211 Thus, cruelty was understood as 
any conduct which causes or has potential to cause danger to life, limb, or health.212 The 
conduct constituting cruelty included acts which cause economic, mental, physical, and 
sexual harm.213  
Not all ‘trying and tiresome’ conduct established cruelty.214 In terms of physical harm, the 
court had to be satisfied that the respondent had inflicted serious bodily injury or 
apprehension of it upon the petitioner.215 There was reluctance to accept slight injuries as 
constituting cruelty.216 If the injuries were not severe, courts would infer cruelty only where 
the acts of violence were repetitive.217 Therefore, as a matter of general principle, if there was 
only a single incident of violence, it had to be gross to be accepted as cruelty.  
As to sexual abuse, courts could not accept adultery on its own as a form of cruelty.218 For it 
to amount to cruelty, special circumstances had to be proved.219 This position, however, is far 
removed from the reality of present society. With the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Malawi, it can 
hardly be denied that a single act of adultery is sufficient to give rise to reasonable 
apprehension of danger to one’s health and life.220  
On the other hand, the traditional courts did not approach the issue of cruelty by surrounding 
it with definitions or legal tests. It appears that matters were taken from a common-sense 
point of view. On top of acts of physical violence, traditional courts were ready to assign the 
term ‘cruelty’ where a man contracted a polygamous marriage without consulting his first 
wife.221 
Notwithstanding the position on consent in contracting a polygamous marriage, the 
traditional courts did not regard adultery as a serious breach of marital commitment. In one 
case, the court took the view that at customary law, parties often forgive each other for 
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adultery and that they rarely adduce it as a ground for divorce.222 In comparing the remedies 
available under customary law and statutory law, the same court held that “[a]dultery, which 
is considered a ground for dissolving the marriage under the Marriage Act, is a matter of 
compensation at customary law”.223  
Whether that was a true reflection of customary law as it was then is debatable. It is unlikely 
that such views form part of modern/living customary family law. Due to low levels of risk 
associated with adultery, customary law, then, may not have assigned danger to sexual 
irresponsibility. Presently, adultery is life threatening. The same principle behind the rule that 
unconsented polygamy is cruelty should extend the meaning of cruelty to the irresponsibility 
of a husband exposing his wife to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. 
Another point to note from the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act is the recognition 
of the right of a spouse to deny sexual intercourse on certain grounds.224 For example, a 
spouse can exercise this right because of poor health, post-natal recuperation and reasonable 
respect for custom.225 The Act does not specify remedies which can be sought where 
intercourse under these circumstances is forced on a spouse. However, before the enactment 
of the Act, a customary marriage could be dissolved on such grounds. In Moffat v Moffat226, 
divorce was granted by a magistrates’ court where the wife gave evidence of forced sexual 
intercourse while menstruating and when she was asleep.  
Outside the marriage relationship, incidences of unconsented sex amount to rape.227 For 
married couples, these incidents do not constitute rape except where the parties are on 
judicial separation.228 Therefore, unless the spouses are on judicial separation, husbands 
cannot be prosecuted for raping their wives. Viewed from this perspective, judicial separation 
is a remedy which can protect women from apprehended acts of sexual violence.  
It is the right of all women to have access to all these remedies.229 Both statutory law and 
customary law create room for various kinds of dispute resolution processes to facilitate the 
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procedure of claiming the remedies.230 Yet private dispute resolution, if unregulated, is 
capable of laying obstacles in front of the ‘doors’ of the court. The concept of ADR provides 
a way of using several modes of dispute resolution concurrently with court process. 
4.3 ADR, Marital Violence and Remedies 
Appropriate Dispute Resolution requires the state to regulate the multiplicity of mechanisms 
of dispute resolution to ensure that courts are always open for every female person to enforce 
and realise her rights. The discussion in this section looks at the availability of such 
regulation to ensure access to courts and legal remedies for women victimised by violence in 
customary marriages.  
4.3.1 Provision for Non-Court Processes of Dispute Resolution  
As observed in chapter 2, the abbreviation ‘ADR’ in dispute resolution is sometimes used to 
stand for the term ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’.231 This concept is reflected in various 
regimes which embrace different processes for resolving disputes in the justice system. This, 
in some provisions, is the case with the legislation which deals with marital violence in 
Malawi.  
The first provision to note is section 8 of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. The 
heading of this section reads as follows: “Court may make a direction for alternative dispute 
resolution”. Under this section, an applicant or respondent can apply to the court to suspend 
the proceedings of obtaining a protection order. This application can be granted if both 
parties agree to undergo an ‘alternative’ dispute resolution process.232  
What is striking with this provision is that it treats the proceedings of hearing the application 
of a protection order as mutually exclusive to referring the parties to another process of 
dispute resolution. In this regard, the application of referring the matter to mediation or 
counselling can be made only before the issuing of a protection order.233 If such reference is 
made, the proceedings of granting the protection order are suspended.234  
There is danger that this procedure can be abused by the violent spouse. For the purposes of 
delaying or escaping litigation, the respondent may repeatedly resort to stay the proceedings, 
                                                          
230 S 13(l) of the Constitution. 
231 Spencer op cit note 82 at 24. 





pending further counselling process. To avoid this, the Act prohibits the court from 
suspending the proceedings of granting a protection order for more than once.235 Implicit in 
this prohibition is a recognition of the risk of referring parties in a marital violence dispute to 
mediation or counselling at the expense of the court’s proceedings. Still more, one wonders 
why the Act allows the risk of violence even if it is only once.  
The fact that this provision can be invoked only with the consent of the victimised party does 
not justify its rigidity. It is an underestimation of power imbalances which exist between 
women victims of marital violence and their husbands to suggest that consent from the victim 
is enough for the state to suspend her protection. Additionally, the provision overlooks the 
victim’s levels of mental disturbance and vulnerability to manipulation during mediation. It 
would have been more appropriate for the provision to leave room for courts to assess each 
matter and exercise their discretion accordingly. As will be noted in the next section and in 
chapter 5, it is not impossible for courts to allow the issuance of a protection order and 
counselling to run concurrently.  
A similar provision under the same Act is section 39. This section gives the court power to 
suspend the granting of a protection order on condition that the parties agree to receive 
professional counselling. Unlike section 8, this provision can be invoked by the court on its 
own volition. In applying it, the court has to be satisfied of the following conditions: that the 
incident was not a repeated conduct of violence; that there are circumstances which make it 
desirable to preserve the family unit; that the violent conduct is not grave; and that the 
applicant has consented that the matter be referred to counselling.236  
As opposed to these two provisions, under section 52, the Act embraces the concept of 
‘Appropriate Dispute Resolution’. This provision is significant to customary law dispute 
resolution as it directly and specifically makes reference to ankhoswe237 and chiefs. It allows 
the court to recommend counselling to the parties.238 The wording of the provision does not 
tie the hands of the court to choose between granting a protection order and referring the 
matter to another process of dispute resolution. In addition to granting the relief of a 
protection order, the court can refer the parties to pursue mediation. 
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4.3.2 Alternative or Complementary Efforts?  
The ‘alternative’ conceptualisation of ADR in dealing with violence is inconvenient. As 
already observed, the word ‘alternative’ is undesirable. It restricts parties to one method of 
dispute resolution to the exclusion of others. In practice, this is ineffective when dealing with 
marital violence.  
The challenge is that in disputes of marital violence, there is, at times, the need to employ 
several processes of dispute resolution. For instance, there could be scenarios where the wife 
is desirous of keeping her marriage. At the same time, she may be at real risk of suffering 
more violent acts from her husband. If the court suspends the granting of a protection order to 
save the marriage by referring her to ankhoswe, it fails to protect her from the likelihood of 
other acts of violence. Similarly, in such situations, there is danger on the part of the court of 
escalating the conflict if it follows the adversarial procedure of issuing the protection order 
without advising the parties to seek counselling or other means of resolving the dispute.  
The problem in disputes of marital violence where there is room to save the marriage is not 
finding one perfect process to resolve the dispute. To deal ‘appropriately’ with the dispute 
may require engaging several processes. Therefore, the victim should not be prevented from 
seeking help from the court regardless of whether she has already participated in ankhoswe 
mediation or other ADR processes. 
The court can also deal with this problem by offering mediation. This approach is in tandem 
with customary law procedure as was used by traditional courts in divorce matters.239 This, 
however, would require that judicial officers are trained to offer facilitative and advisory 
forms of dispute resolution. Thus, on top of referring parties to ankhoswe mediation, the court 
would also offer counselling to the parties.240 This has the advantage of removing adversarial 
tones from the court proceedings. Orders which can be imposed in that environment might be 
less likely to be interpreted negatively than those issued with adversarial procedure. 
To an extent, the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act encourages this approach. 
Under it, the court has the responsibility of minimising distress to the parties throughout the 
procedure of dissolving their marriage.241 The Act cautions courts to avoid escalating conflict 
by avoiding questions which can lead to further wreckage of the relationship between the 
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spouses.242 Instead, the court is encouraged to handle the matter in a way calculated to help 
the couple maintain a workable relationship.243 
Therefore, the goal of ADR in marital violence disputes needs to shift from merely providing 
‘alternatives’ to offering multiple processes of dispute resolution in order to optimise access 
to justice. This is significant especially in cases where women need protection from marital 
violence and at the same time do not want to lose the opportunity for reconciliation. This 
balance cannot be achieved if mediation is mandated to run on the condition of excluding 
court process.  
4.4 The Legal Framework of Mandatory Mediation in Customary Law Marriages 
4.4.1 General Principles in Resolving Matrimonial Disputes 
The aim of ADR in family law is to provide appropriate methods of dispute resolution that 
are capable of balancing the interests of all stakeholders in the family unit. Methods which 
encourage reconciliation assist in protecting the family unit from disintegration. In making 
sure that couples stay together, the state fulfils part of its duty to protect the welfare of 
children. In pursuing these ends, the individual interests of the spouses seeking redress from 
consequences of marriage breakdown should not be ignored.  
The Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act provides general principles aimed at 
helping courts to balance these interests when handling marriage disputes.244 The stipulated 
principles apply to all types of marriages, including customary law marriages. The first 
principle echoes the words of the Constitution by enjoining the court to take into 
consideration that the institution of marriage is to be protected.245 Both the Constitution and 
the Act do not provide further details on what this protection entails.  
In the eyes of customary law this protection could be interpreted to mean that the court will 
have to be slow in granting petitions of divorce or judicial separation. This reasoning can be 
traced from the NTAC case of NyaNg’ambi v Mkandawire.246 In support of a protectionist 
approach to the marriage institution, the National Traditional Appeal Court made the 
following remarks: 
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‘[Marriage] creates a mutual joy and cohesion between families, and clans which are the 
bulwark of the society, community and the nation. It is for this reason that dissolution of the 
marriage is made more difficult by our custom. Our custom requires that before a marriage is 
dissolved the spouses must have allowed the advocates from both sides to discuss the 
matter.’247  
From this quotation, it is clear that the office of the ankhoswe is central to protecting the 
institution of marriage from divorce. What is not clear is the extent of the discretion and 
jurisdiction which the ankhoswe can exercise in protecting the marriage institution. The 
question is: are all disputes worthy of the procedure of making dissolution of marriage 
difficult by subjecting the parties to mandatory counselling and conciliation efforts?  
The Act provides that, “the parties to a marriage which may have broken down are to take all 
practical steps, whether by counselling or otherwise, to save the marriage”248. The 
Commission on the Review of Laws on Marriage and Divorce interprets this provision with a 
tone of mandatory obligation.249 It suggests that under this provision, “a couple shall be 
required to go for mediation”.250 Furthermore, the Commission viewed this provision as one 
requiring evidence of attempts to restore the marriage to be adduced before the court can 
dissolve it.251 
Although such mandatory obligations can be constructed from this provision, the same 
should not be interpreted without exceptions. The exceptions can be read from the phrase 
‘practical steps’. The word ‘practical’ can be understood to mean useful, appropriate, 
sensible, and likely to be effective.252 Thus, the provision can be construed as requiring 
parties to take steps towards saving their marriage where such available steps are practical. In 
other words, the court should not demand steps to be taken where the available non-court 
processes aimed at saving the marriage are ineffective. Whether the sought-after-processes 
are appropriate or effective in a particular case will have to depend on the type and nature of 
reasons behind the petition for divorce or separation.  
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There are other principles under the Act that give further room for exceptional circumstances 
to mandatory mediation. For example, the Act requires courts to dissolve marriages “with 
minimum distress to the parties and to any affected children”.253 In addition, the courts are 
asked to facilitate the whole process of divorce “without costs being unreasonably 
incurred”.254.  
These factors should call for a balance between mandatory mediation, counselling or 
conciliation, and avoiding unnecessary distress and costs. Mediation, conciliation and 
counselling may help to reduce costs by avoiding litigation. Yet these processes can also 
increase costs where the parties proceed with trial after failing to reach a settlement.255 In 
customary law marriages, where the ankhoswe stay far away from the residential home of the 
couple, money for transport and time delays can be costly as well. This means that if parties 
are mandated to use other mechanisms of dispute resolution without assessing each case on 
its own merit, the procedure can also compound costs instead of reducing them.  
Making the procedure more costly hinders access to court remedies. Having already spent 
time, money and other resources in mandatory conciliation, a party may not be willing to use 
any further dispute resolution mechanism.256 This may result from a fear of escalating the 
emotional distress that accompanies the tension of matrimonial disputes. This distress is 
multiplied in cases involving violence. Recognising this, the Marriage, Divorce and Family 
Relations Act puts responsibility on the court to remove any risk of violence to any of the 
parties and to children.257 However, as stated before, the private nature of non-court processes 
poses a challenge to efforts of removing violence. Therefore, it is necessary that the decision 
by courts to recommend other dispute resolution processes should be made only when such 
processes are appropriate and effective to curb the violence.  
The likelihood of further abuse to women as a result of unavailability of legal compulsion to 
back resolutions reached in mediation must not be ignored. There is also a broader picture of 
violence which should not be overlooked. The interest of protecting a particular marriage or 
family should be balanced with the interest of the state in eliminating all forms of violence 
against women. By delegating the handling of violent marriage disputes to private forums, 
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the deterring effect of judicial pronouncements is lost. This confidentiality of justice 
compromises the state’s effort in removing the culture of violence by men against women.  
Conclusively, there is a need to balance mandatory efforts put in place to save a marriage and 
other competing interests. To strike this balance, the system of family law dispute resolution 
should emphasise allocation of disputes to forums based on appropriateness.  
4.4.2 Applicability of Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules to Customary Law 
Marriage Disputes 
Under the Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules, all parties in civil matters are obligated to 
submit their disputes to mediation before the commencement of trial.258 As an exception, the 
rules do not apply to proceedings concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Constitution.259 Other proceedings excluded from mandatory mediation include matters 
concerning the liberty of an individual and judicial review.260  
The exclusion of these proceedings is an example of screening matters out of the jurisdiction 
of mediation. Thus, the law deems it inappropriate for matters dealing with liberty of persons, 
interpretation of the Constitution, and judicial review to undergo mandatory mediation. These 
may be styled as ‘non-negotiable’, as parties are free to directly approach the court without 
the need of mediation.  
These exceptions notwithstanding, the provisions of the Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules 
apply in all civil matters.261 As previously observed, the mandatory requirement of mediation 
has been further reflected in the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. Unlike the 
Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules, the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act does 
not expressly provide for exceptional circumstances exempted from mandatory mediation, 
counselling or conciliation.  
There are therefore no screening provisions exempting certain marriage disputes from 
mediation in the Act. Similarly, under customary family law, the jurisdictional limits of 
ankhoswe are not clear. What this means is that the only statutory screening provisions from 
which reference can be made are those under the Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules.  
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However, the wording and demands of the Rules bring doubt as to whether they are 
applicable in customary law marriage disputes. For example, the Rules require that 
mediators, except where parties agree otherwise, should be chosen from a list maintained by 
the High Court Registrar.262 This should be contrasted with the office of the ankhoswe in 
customary law which operates by default without need for registration.  
Another provision in the Rules which challenges the practice of ankhoswe mediation is the 
obligation on mediators to file written reports with the court.263 This is in contradiction with 
the nature of customary law which hinges on oral tradition.264 As will be shown in the next 
chapter, in customary law practice, the ankhoswe are required to give an oral explanation to 
the court on what transpired during mediation.265 
Contrary to customary law’s ankhoswe mediation practice, the Rules also prohibit mediators 
from being witnesses if the dispute proceeds to court for trial.266 In addition, the Rules do not 
allow a party to mediation to rely on statements made at the mediation session as evidence in 
court proceedings.267 This also disagrees with customary law practice, which allows parties to 
adduce statements made during mediation as evidence.268 
Therefore, it would be a fair conclusion to state that the Courts (Mandatory) Mediation Rules 
are applicable to all civil disputes under statutory and common law. One has to refer to living 
customary law to establish the rules which govern the relationship between trial and other 
dispute resolution processes. Chapter 5 discusses this relationship by answering the question 
whether customary law empowers ankhoswe dispute resolution with a capacity to effectively 
adjudicate over marital violence disputes. 
4.5 Conclusion  
Arguably, marital violence should have been screened out from the application of the Courts 
(Mandatory) Mediation Rules. An abused party should voluntarily choose to mediate after 
being protected by the court. Yet there is a danger that the drafting of the Rules and the 
legislation on marital violence can be interpreted to mean that an abused party should seek 
mediation before being protected by the court. This illogical arrangement of procedure does 
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not only underestimate the harm marital violence brings upon the individual victim, but also 
neglects the danger that marital violence poses on children.  
In most cases, marital violence requires urgent attention to protect the victimised party. This 
sense of urgency is lost when courts leave victims of marital violence in the hands of 
mediators who cannot provide them with enforceable legal remedies. This is what the law 
does when it creates room for conceptualising ADR as a system of alternatives. It is also this 
philosophy in the form of mandatory mediation which legitimises the delay of granting 
protection to women abused by their husbands. Sadly, these elements are traceable in the 
statutes which outline the remedies addressing marital violence. Fortunately, statutory law 




CHAPTER 5: APPROPRIATENESS OF ANKHOSWE  
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
5.1 Introduction 
As has been observed in the previous chapters, every legal system needs effective processes 
of dispute resolution in order to deal with marital violence. The state would fail in its 
responsibility as a duty bearer to protect women from violence if the justice system used 
ineffective mechanisms to remedy marital violence. Concerning ankhoswe dispute resolution, 
the primary question is whether the ankhoswe mediation is effective enough to handle marital 
violence disputes?  
This chapter offers an analysis of certain aspects of ankhoswe dispute resolution to answer 
that question. These aspects are: neutrality and impartiality; confidentiality; and 
enforceability of agreements. The main argument is that ankhoswe mediation lacks 
impartiality and coercive powers to protect women from marital violence. It is observed, 
however, that the principles of confidentiality in ankhoswe mediation are more suitable to 
customary law dispute resolution than are the corresponding principles of statutory law 
mediation.  
5.2 The Institution of Ankhoswe  
In matrilineal ethnic groups, the rightful candidate for the nkhoswe was traced through the 
mother. The mother’s brothers were the ones entitled to take this position.269 The eldest of 
them would assume a leadership role in exercising authority over his sisters.270 This authority 
extended to looking after the wellbeing of the sisters’ children.271 The children together with 
their mother were referred to as his mbumba.272 Hence, the nkhoswe also took the title of 
mwini mbumba (which literally means ‘owner of the clan’).273 This tradition is still in practice 
in most matrilineal rural areas.274 
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From the standpoint of the children, the mwini mbumba is their maternal uncle or senior 
brother.275 In celebrating a customary marriage, it was the mwini mbumba’s (or his brothers’) 
responsibility to validate the marriage by assuming his role as nkhoswe.276 Due to this 
arrangement, it was in exceptional circumstances where the nkhoswe could be a woman. The 
eldest maternal aunt to the spouse would only take over the nkhoswe role where there was no 
male available.277 
5.2.1 The Principle behind the Dispute Resolution Function of Ankhoswe 
The title ankhoswe is translated to various English phrases like ‘marriage advocates’, 
‘marriage counsellors’, ‘marriage witnesses’, and ‘marriage guardians’.278 These various 
renderings are not a result of inaccurate translation but an indication of the different roles the 
ankhoswe play. In his role as mwini mbumba, the nkhoswe is responsible for ensuring that his 
sister’s children have access to economic resources including land for cultivation.279 He has 
further interests in arranging marriages of his mbumba after which he acts as their 
mediator.280 This is to the extent that in cases where the marriage of the mbumba had 
children, traditional courts were reluctant to issue divorce prior to ankhoswe mediation taking 
place.281  
A theme of promoting and advocating for the welfare of women and children runs through all 
these duties of the ankhoswe. To this end, customary law employed the means of ankhoswe 
mediation to shield marriages from ending in divorce. The benefits of this protectionist 
approach to the marriage institution can be appreciated by looking at the implications of 
divorce to women and children before the advent of legislative laws. For example, based on 
tradition, after divorce the wife had no right to claim for maintenance for both the children 
and herself.282  
Although the institution of ankhoswe played this important role in the lives of married 
women, it had its setbacks as well. The mediation process was prone to abuse. The wife 
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would be encouraged to endure all kinds of difficulties in the name of saving the marriage. 
This could be done to maintain the services of the husband to the clan of his wife. For 
instance, the husband was required to provide bride services to his parents in law which 
included building a house and cultivating a garden.283 The right to inherit children and family 
wealth after the husband’s death also lay with the maternal clan.284  
With these advantages in mind, the nkhoswe would encourage his sister to stay in an abusive 
marriage. In turn, the whole process promoted viewing women as a source of human capital 
and economic gains for the matrilineage.285 Therefore, although on the surface, the institution 
of ankhoswe may be regarded as one of protecting the welfare of women and children, it has 
patriarchal interests as well. Having established themselves as protectors of their sisters’ 
welfare, the ankhoswe have an influence on the decision-making of women in marriages.286 
This relationship creates dependence of women on male kinsmen.287  
However, by subjecting the institution of ankhoswe to the Constitution, the discriminatory 
and patriarchal tones of the system can be filtered out through legal reform. At the same time, 
the principle of protecting the welfare of women and children can be maintained. This 
principle in the modern context extends to protecting women from marital violence.  
5.2.2 The function of ankhoswe and the dynamics of modern society 
The application of the concept of mwini mbumba in modern society is contentious. The 
current legal setup favours the nuclear construction of a family. In order to validate a 
marriage of a person between the ages of 16 and 18, the Constitution requires parental or 
guardian consent.288 In addition, inheritance law now recognises only children and the 
surviving spouse as constituting immediate family members.289 
Urbanisation, has also posed a challenge to the extended family setup. As couples move to 
cities for purposes of work or in search of better social services, the extended family links are 
geographically broken. In such circumstances, sticking to rigid references to traditions that 
require physical presence of blood relations becomes costly and inconvenient. 
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The traditional court system responded to some of these circumstances. In Mwangobola v 
Mwangobola290, the husband challenged the validity of the marriage on the ground of 
legitimacy of ankhoswe. He argued that the marriage was invalid because his ankhoswe was 
not his relative. In fact, he claimed that both ankhoswe were the relatives of the wife. The 
court dismissed the argument and held that under customary law anybody can properly be 
ankhoswe to a marriage.  
Part of the reasoning of the court was that situations occur where the parties’ actual relations 
are far and a party could not furnish proper marriage advocates. It was held that “at 
customary law such an impasse was resolved by the guardian or even the party's close friends 
assuming the functions of a marriage advocate.”291 The court, therefore, found that there were 
proper ankhoswe to the marriage. It refused to strictly limit the office of the ankhoswe to 
qualifications of blood relations.  
The relevance of involving ankhoswe for purposes of offering consent to the marriage seems 
diluted to the extent that the court could accept friends of a spouse to act as marriage 
advocates. While this may be understood as constituting an exception to the general rule, it 
also demonstrates the flexibility and adaptability of customary law. Whichever construction 
is followed, what is evident is that traditional courts looked at the qualification to the office 
of ankhoswe from a practical point of view. 
However, when the institution of ankhoswe is detached from its blood ties, the dispute 
resolution aspect also becomes affected. In recognising the need to ‘accept anybody’ as 
qualifying to the office of the ankhoswe in certain circumstances, there is also a need to 
realise that not everybody can handle marital violence disputes. Similarly, disputes which 
were previously appropriate for ankhoswe to resolve may not have remained as such due to 
the changes in society. Some of the changes have had an impact on the neutrality and 
impartiality of the ankhoswe when resolving marriage disputes.  
5.3 Neutrality and Impartiality 
Mediator neutrality and impartiality refers to the principle that mediators should not favour 
one party over another.292 Some literature differentiate neutrality and impartiality. The latter 
is defined as the ability of a mediator not to be biased towards or against any of the disputants 
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during mediation; whilst the former is defined as the requirement that the mediator should be 
a disinterested party to the content and outcome of the dispute.293 In this regard, neutrality 
would mean that the mediator should be an outsider with no interest in the matter.294 On the 
other hand, impartiality would mean that the outsider should handle the mediation process 
without showing bias towards one party.295  
Based on this distinction, the question is whether the ankhoswe can be said to be neutral 
mediators. This question is prompted by the fact that, mostly, the ankhoswe are relatives of 
the parties. Being in that position they have interest in the outcome of mediation. However, a 
close look into the structure of dispute resolution at customary law shows differences 
between how western and most African civilizations understand the concept of neutrality. 
The definitions of neutrality and impartiality above reflects the western conceptualisation.  
Traditionally, the structure of communities in Malawi is knit together by close ties of 
extended family responsibilities.296 At each level of society, leadership roles are held based 
on affiliation to extended families and clans.297 In these communities, the expectation is that 
heads of families, clans and tribal elders, who command the respect of the family, clan or 
tribe, will advise people during a dispute.298  
In this context couples may regard outsiders as illegitimate to facilitate mediation. Instead, 
they would want to have their close relatives to act as mediators. In other words, what matters 
is not that the mediation should be facilitated by an outsider. Instead, what is important to 
them is that the process and actual settlement should be fair.299  
In any type of mediation, regardless of different conceptualisation of neutrality and 
impartiality, the mediators’ own life experiences, education, cultural background and beliefs 
have an impact on the outcome of the settlement.300 Although the role of mediators does not 
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extend to the making of determinative decisions, the process can still be used to indirectly 
influence the agreement between the parties.301  
With room to use their role to shape the course of deliberations the ankhoswe can as well 
impact on the final outcome of disputes. Such influence can be driven by personal, traditional 
and community values. Success in preventing and ending marital violence through ankhoswe 
mediation partly depends on the type of value system the ankhoswe subscribes to.  
We should anticipate unfavourable results of mediation to women if the marriage beliefs of 
the ankhoswe are predominantly patriarchal. For example, the ankhoswe who believe in the 
tradition that marriage must be persevered are likely to encourage women to endure marital 
violence.302 The results could be worse in cultures where a husband’s physical violence 
against his wife is justified on the basis of disciplining her.303 As a result of these cultural 
beliefs, instead of correcting power imbalances in customary law marriages, the ankhoswe act 
as agents of legitimising violence.  
The neutrality and impartiality of ankhoswe should also be assessed in terms of the 
relationship between the ankhoswe and the couples. In this circumstance, the relationship 
should be viewed comprehensively to include social and financial aspects. In cases where the 
ankhoswe financially depend on the husband their objectivity is compromised. The situation 
is complicated where the wife is also financially dependent on the husband.  
Women’s capacity to effectively negotiate in mediation is negatively affected when they are 
financially more vulnerable than their husbands.304 This vulnerability can be checked where 
the third party resolving the dispute is independent. However, when the ankhoswe are also 
financially dependent on the husband, they are likely to fail in rectifying the existing power 
imbalances between the spouses. 
The ability of the husband in such mediations to manipulate the outcome of the negotiations 
is high. He may deliberately intimidate to end or prolong the mediation discussion if the wife 
refuses to bow down to his demands.305 This can coerce women into accepting unjust or 
ineffective compromises that can hardly put a stop to marital violence.306 
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This can be illustrated by the facts of the High Court appeal case of Gomani v Chitenje307. 
The marriage, in this matter was polygamous. The husband subjected the first wife to 
physical violence for four years having neglected her for the other wife. The violence had 
continued irrespective of involving the ankhoswe to mediate. The injuries on the victim were 
extreme to the extent that she lost some of her teeth. At one time she had fainted because of 
being beaten. She endured all these difficulties because she could not leave the matrimonial 
home as she had nowhere to go.308 
Thus, economic power imbalances, have the capacity of rendering the efforts of ankhoswe 
mediation ineffective. This can change where the courts are involved and women are aware 
of their legal entitlements. For instance, if the courts had supervised the dispute in the 
Gomani case309, the wife would have been able to apply for a protection order and claim 
maintenance at the same time. The social and financial security which the court would have 
provided would have helped her to be self-determinative during mediation and afterwards.  
Allowing the court to handle the financial and violence aspects of the dispute can also help to 
guard the neutrality and impartiality of the ankhoswe from being exploited by the abusive 
husband.  
5.4 Confidentiality 
Generally, confidentiality in mediation restricts the mediator and the disputants from 
revealing the content of the mediation to non-parties.310 Most mediations are regulated by 
confidentiality clauses which allow disclosure of information to others only with the consent 
of all the disputants. The disadvantages of this private nature of dispute resolution to marital 
violence, as perceived by feminism, were outlined in chapter 2.  
There is another dimension of confidentiality which needs to be discussed. It is the common 
law principle of ‘without prejudice’. In the context of mediation, this principle implies that, if 
parties go to trial, they are prohibited, for evidential purposes, from making reference to 
statements made during mediation.311 This means that if an admission is made during 
mediation, the court cannot admit it to form part of the evidence of the party relying on it.312 
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Due to this principle, most ‘Agreements to Mediate’ contain a clause excluding the mediator 
from the duty to be called as a witness.313 
Confidentiality is a critical element of mediation. It permits and encourages parties to discuss 
matters freely. Under the atmosphere of confidentiality, parties feel more secure to share 
interests and to rethink their positions.314 In other words, confidentiality seeks to prevent 
mediation from being used as a forum to fish out evidence from the opponent party for 
litigation purposes.315  
As already stated, there are also difficulties emanating from secrecy in mediation. From a 
marital violence point of view, confidentiality breeds injustice. Disputants can misuse the 
process to manipulate and take advantage of each other in the absence of intervention by the 
courts.316 
Unlike mediation provided under statute or common law, the principle of ‘without prejudice’ 
does not exist under customary law. To the contrary, ankhoswe have a duty to testify before 
courts.317 They provide the court with information on the number and type of disputes they 
handled, what happened in mediation and whether they managed to successfully bring the 
parties together.318 Similarly, parties are allowed to refer to what was said during ankhoswe 
mediation to prove a fact.319  
This aspect of ankhoswe mediation is beneficial to women in marital violence cases. It 
relieves victimised women from the impossibility of proving their case where the acts of 
violence were done in secrecy. However, the challenge comes in where each nkhoswe decides 
to give favourable evidence in support of his/her kin. In the case of Nkono v Nkono320, both 
parties and their witnesses gave evidence on what happened during the mediation session. 
Still, the High Court failed to ascertain the evidence in favour of either party because it was 
conflicting. Therefore, the court is likely to use evidence from mediation where both 
ankhoswe corroborate the version of one of the parties.  
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It is also significant to note that the fact that there is no restriction for the parties or ankhoswe 
to testify based on the contents of mediation does not rectify all confidentiality challenges. 
For example, the ankhoswe mediation has no mechanism of making ‘public’ the settlement 
agreement. The settlement, which is orally agreed, cannot be enforced through court order. 
The parties, therefore, have no legal support to make good their promises. 
5.5 Enforceability of Agreements 
In other types of mediation, settlements can be enforced in court in form of consent orders. In 
reference to ankhoswe mediation, there is no mechanism which allows the oral agreements to 
be enforced through court order. In the past, it was once suggested by a traditional court that 
the ankhoswe have power to penalise a spouse who is at fault.321 Beyond that there is hardly 
literature which has explained how this was done.  
From a historical perspective, it can be imagined that the ankhoswe were able to exercise 
arbitrative powers due to their position as mwini mbumba. It may not be difficult to 
appreciate that the ankhoswe were authoritative as they were in control economically. For 
instance, as earlier noted, the mwini mbumba had control over allocation of land to his kin.322 
This gave him a position of power and control towards the spouses.  
With the coming in of the cash economy, ownership of resources has changed in modern 
societies. The mwini mbumba no longer has an automatic position of influence and affluence. 
To the contrary, for most couples who stay in urban areas but have their ankhoswe back in the 
villages, the ankhoswe are often the dependents of the husband. In such circumstances, the 
ankhoswe can hardly exert independent influence on the husband. 
This should also be considered with the understanding that the role of ankhoswe can be 
played by a total stranger or a mere friend of a spouse.323 Indeed, it is hard to picture how, 
after a conciliation session, a friend can impose sanctions to enforce his directions.  
Generally, therefore, the ankhoswe dispute resolution lacks internal enforcement 
mechanisms. There is also no provision which allows settlement agreements facilitated by the 
ankhoswe to be enforced by the court. This leaves the institution of ankhoswe without 
coercive powers to combat marital violence.  
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Consequently, ankhoswe mediation practiced to the exclusion of court’s supervision has 
potential of exposing victims of marital violence to a system which cannot effectively protect 
them. On top of that, it carries the risk of engendering learned helplessness in women. These 
risks are reflected in some recent cases post the traditional court system. The facts in Gomani 
case324 demonstrates the results of a victimised wife who became ‘helpless’ because of using 
ankhoswe mediation to the exclusion of court’s supervision.  
Another example is the case of Magombo v Magombo.325 In this matter the husband 
continued to physically abuse his wife irrespective of her efforts to refer disputes to the 
ankhoswe, the church and traditional authorities. The husband and his nkhoswe managed to 
frustrate conciliation efforts by absconding mediation. He would further physically chase 
away people who came to reconcile him with his wife. Having been victimised, the wife felt 
‘helpless’ and left to live in the village without going to court.  
These instances illustrate the misfortune of conceptualising ankhoswe dispute resolution as an 
alternative path to courts’ remedies when dealing with marital violence. Although 
maintaining a marriage relationship requires counselling; protecting women from marital 
violence goes beyond giving couples advice. As such, it is unattainable to achieve both goals 
of maintaining the marriage relationship and ending violence by using ankhoswe mediation to 
the exclusion of the courts.  
The court is better placed with its sanctioning powers to protect abused women from further 
assaults by their husbands. This is not to suggest that the orders of the court cannot be 
disobeyed. Instead, the proposition is that the system of the court has the ability of following 
up on acts of contempt. In punishing these acts, the aim goes beyond protecting a single 
victimised woman to providing a legal environment which is intolerant of marital violence. 
This legal environment is significant as it informs living customary law. Through courts’ 
public decisions, the general public is made aware of the current position of the law towards 
marital violence. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In rural areas the ankhoswe dispute resolution remains an important institution for mediating 
marriage disputes. Unlike formal state institutions, the ankhoswe are within easy reach in 
these areas. On top of helping couples to achieve desirable behavioural changes, the 
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ankhoswe make it easier for women to prove violence in court. Through the flexibility of 
customary law women are enabled to prove secret acts of violence which were admitted 
during mediation. Thus, these positive traits of ankhoswe dispute resolution can be used to 
complement court processes.  
While the ankhoswe institution is still necessary for counselling and conciliation of disputing 
spouses, it lacks coercive powers to protect women from marital violence. Legal and socio-
economic changes surrounding the family institution in matrilineal societies have left the 
ankhoswe with less capacity to protect women from marital violence. Financial vulnerability 
of both the ankhoswe and the women they are supposed to protect compromises their 
independence and impartiality.  
Owing to these limitations, the ankhoswe mediation should neither be obligatory nor made to 
run exclusively of court process. The ankhoswe institution should only be one of the many 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 Conclusion and Main Observations 
The aim of this research was to find out whether women married under customary law have 
access to effective means of dispute resolution to remedy marital violence. The general 
observation this research has made is that although the law provides for marital violence 
remedies, women, especially from rural areas, do not have adequate access to them. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of the study holds true.  
Factors which contribute to denying these women access to justice include the use of 
complex procedures which do not suit the cultural context of rural Malawians. The hindrance 
for women in accessing court remedies is not necessarily because the ankhoswe dispute 
resolution on its own diverts women’s attention from the courts. To the contrary, there is a 
high possibility that the current court system with its inaccessible procedures repels women 
in need of its remedies. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the court system in order for 
it to incorporate customary law processes of dispute resolution for easy accessibility. At the 
same time, it is important to maintain the compulsory nature of court orders in order to 
prevent further abuse against women. 
There is also a lack of statutory regulation to define and delimit the jurisdiction of private 
dispute resolution, which includes ankhoswe mediation. The absence of this regulation allows 
the ankhoswe to resolve disputes of marital violence when their capacity is inadequate. This 
situation is partly attributable to the misconception of ADR as ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution’. Since private forums of dispute resolution are regarded as ‘alternative 
institutions’ to the courts, parties, without proper assessment of their justice needs, are 
referred to them.  
Moreover, conceptualising ADR as a system of ‘alternatives’ presumes that one mechanism 
or institution of dispute resolution is sufficient, at a given point in time, to provide access to 
justice for women in marital violence. Yet the research has observed in chapter 4 that, often 
in a single marital violence dispute, there is the need to employ several modes of dispute 
resolution to address different justice needs of the parties. 
It has been further noticed that it would be more appropriate to reconceptualise the justice 
system in Malawi as a provider of ‘appropriate dispute resolution’ instead of ‘alternative 
dispute resolution’. In this regard, various mechanisms of dispute resolution should be 
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applied to complement each other, thereby providing optimum protection to victims of 
marital violence.  
The conclusion made in chapter 5 is that the ankhoswe dispute resolution is unsuitable in 
cases where women, without accessing courts, approach the ankhoswe to resolve marital 
violence. This is because the ankhoswe cannot provide the required protection and security 
available and accessible through court process. Without the courts’ legal compulsion to 
enforce resolutions reached during ankhoswe mediation, women remain exposed to further 
abuse. In addition, living customary law is misinformed because courts lose the opportunity 
of making judicial pronouncements to condemn violence against women. In the end, the 
state’s effort to eliminate the culture of violence by men against women is highly 
compromised.  
6.2 Recommendations 
There is a need to make changes to the current system of dispute resolution for the purpose of 
improving provision of appropriate dispute resolution to women married under customary 
law. The recommendations to that effect are outlined below. 
6.2.1 Make Mediation (Including Ankhoswe Dispute Resolution) a Voluntary Process 
in Cases of Marital Violence 
Mandatory mediation has some policy advantages. For example, the state has an interest in 
protecting children from the adverse effects of divorce. Hence, minor differences between 
parents which can be easily resolved through counselling should be mandated to undergo 
mediation.  
However, mandatory mediation has the risk of delaying justice and making courts 
inaccessible. When marital violence victims approach the court they seek remedies which, 
mostly, only the court can provide. Therefore, it is ineffective to force a victim of marital 
violence to pursue mediation before accessing courts’ remedies. On this basis, the law and the 
courts should not make mediation (including ankhoswe mediation) a mandatory process in 
cases of marital violence. 
6.2.2 Encourage victims of marital violence to seek court’s remedies concurrently with 
mediation 
The law and courts should not restrict parties to one method of dispute resolution. The court 
offers remedies that provide protection to the victim. Yet other mechanisms such as 
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counselling may be necessary to achieve long-term behavioural changes. As such, where 
there is room to salvage the marriage, courts should encourage victims of marital violence to 
seek court’s remedies concurrently with mediation. 
6.2.3 Provide Enforcement Mechanism for Ankhoswe Mediation Settlements 
In proceedings of a protection order, the court can turn a consent order made by the parties 
into its own order.326 This provision should be amended to make room for settlements made 
through ankhoswe mediation to be enforceable through court process. In this regard, the law 
should require parties in marital violence disputes to register their settlements with the courts 
in form of consent orders. The ankhoswe should be employed to witness the authenticity of 
such agreements. 
6.2.4 Assent to the Local Courts Act for Local Courts to Start Operating 
The other recommendations cannot be effective without an accessible court system. In order 
to protect women fully against marital violence through appropriate dispute resolution, there 
is an urgent need to establish local courts. The presidency needs to assent to the Local Courts 
Act so that local courts can start operating.  
Through the adoption of familiar procedures and languages in the local courts, women 
married under customary law can be empowered to access remedies easily that effectively 
address marital violence. There is a further need to redesign these courts in order to offer 
various processes of dispute resolution based on the justice needs of parties. In line with 
customary law practices, they should be organised to provide both mediation and 
adjudication so that the court can easily monitor compliance to its orders.  
6.2.5 Provide Training to Judicial officers on Appropriate Dispute Resolution and 
Mechanisms of Customary Law Dispute Resolution  
Combining the use of various modes of dispute resolution requires special knowledge, tact 
and skill. The same is true whenever judicial officers are required to complement dictates of 
customary law with statutory law provisions. There is a need to provide training to judicial 
officers on the basic conceptualisation of customary law and how it can be applied in line 
with constitutional imperatives and to complement other legislation. Similarly, judicial 
officers need to have the basic skills of conducting mediation. By acquiring such knowledge 
through training and practice, they would also be better placed to exercise their discretion 
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